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INTRODUCTION 
Green is the new black.  Greenpeace declared: “Climate change is in. 
Global warming is hip.  Pop stars are urging action.  It seems not a day 
passes without another big business making a green pronouncement.”1  In 
the 1990s, increasing public awareness of climate change prompted a con-
sumer movement to address environmental concerns through selective 
product purchasing.2  To capitalize on this consumer trend, manufacturers 
 
 1. Climate Wash - It’s the All New Greenwash, GREENPEACE (July 27, 2007), 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/features/climatewash-greenwash-270707/. 
 2. See Thomas C. Downs, “Environmentally Friendly” Product Advertising: Its Future 
Requires a New Regulatory Authority, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 155, 155 (1992) (“With this heigh-
tened environmental consciousness has come a greater recognition of the consumer’s ability 
to promote environmental protection through selective product purchasing.”); Paul H. Lu-
ehr, Guiding the Green Revolution: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission in Regulat-
ing Environmental Advertising, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 311, 313 (1992) (“Consum-
ers not only seek products that are safer for the environment, they are also willing to pay a 
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created a “green revolution,” a marketing strategy touting the environmen-
tal attributes of a product.3  The movement grew rapidly and continues to 
expand; since 2006, green advertising has nearly tripled.4  The most current 
trend is to describe the carbon attributes of a product, coined a “tsunami” of 
green advertising, which reached a new peak with commercials for a “car-
bon-neutral Super Bowl” and “carbon-neutral Nascar races.”5  While man-
ufacturers continue to advertise using traditional terminology, the focus has 
shifted to the carbon neutrality or sustainability of products. 
Companies’ product sales support the overall rising popularity of 
“green” products.  In 2008 alone, consumers spent five hundred billion dol-
lars on “green” products and services and the market is expected to contin-
ue expanding.6  Major retailers, such as Target and Home Depot, still report 
strong sales in green goods despite the current economic climate and con-
sumer polls indicate that consumers’ commitment to buying environmen-
tally-friendly products has not been altered by the economy.7  For example, 
a survey found that sixty-eight percent of consumers would remain faithful 
to an environmentally-conscious brand and seven out of ten consumers 
would spend more for environmentally-friendly products even in a reces-
sion.8  As green advertising has increased companies’ profitability, rampant 
 
premium to acquire those products.”); Big Opportunities Remain for Green Products, NIEL-
SENWIRE (Mar. 3, 2009), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/consumer/big-opportunities-
remain-for-green-products/. 
 3. See Luehr, supra note 2 (discussing how consumer interest in green products created 
a “tremendous source of potential revenue” and “increasingly aggressive” marketing strate-
gies); Deborah Majoras, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Fed. 
Trade Comm’n’s Workshop on Carbon Offsets and Renewable Energy Certificates 8 (Jan. 
8. 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/carbonoffsets/transcript/opening_ 
dpmajoras.pdf (“Businesses have taken notice, and in the past year there’s been a virtual 
explosion of green marketing.”). 
 4. TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTG., GREENWASHING REPORT 2009, at 4 (2009) [hereinafter 
TERRACHOICE, GREENWASHING REPORT 2009], available at http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/ 
findings/greenwashing-report-2009/. 
 5. Jesse Ellison, Save the Planet, Lose the Guilt, NEWSWEEK, June 28, 2008, available 
at http://www.newsweek.com/2008/06/28/save-the-planet-lose-the-guilt.html. 
 6. Consumer Spending on Green Will Double, Reach $500 Billion in 2008, ENVTL. 
LEADER (Sept. 28, 2007), http://www.environmentalleader.com/2007/09/28/consumer-
spending-on-green-will-double-reach-500-billion-in-2008/.  For example, Arm & Hammer 
Liquid Laundry Detergent is the only detergent with “renewable plant-based soaps to deliver 
powerful cleaning;” Brammo Motorsports advertises that its Enertia Brand motorcycle is the 
“world’s first production zero-emission battery powered plug-in electric motorcycle;” and 
Panasonic advertises its large-screen plasma display as “environmentally friendly.” Id. 
 7. Sara Fister Gale, How to Get Green Goods Flying Off the Shelves, GREENBIZ.COM 
(Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.greenbiz.com/feature/2009/03/02/how-get-green-goods-flying-
off-shelves. 
 8. Id. 
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confusion has emerged among consumers about how to determine the 
truthfulness of environmental claims.9 
Accurate advertising is critical for consumers trying to make product-
purchasing decisions that have meaningful impacts on the environment.  
The largest contributors and populations most vulnerable to climate change 
are in urban locations.10  More than fifty percent of the world’s population 
lives in cities and emits two-thirds of the total energy use worldwide.11  
Coastal cities are particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels, storm surges, 
and flooding; heat trapping in urban landscapes with buildings and pave-
ment creates threats of rising temperatures, increased levels of precipita-
tion, and lower air quality.12  Because of these threats, city governments 
have created climate action plans to lower energy consumption, promote 
sustainability, and create energy efficiency.13  However, city governments 
face significant obstacles in affecting climate change because of the need 
for an effort involving not just governmental actors, but also a commitment 
from society to change.14 
Individuals in urban communities, armed with the knowledge that they 
have both the greatest impact on climate change and the greatest opportuni-
ty to reduce its effects, can be motivated to make substantial changes in 
their personal lives.  On an individual level, that dedication is particularly 
evidenced by their purchasing decisions.  Thus, individual consumers must 
be assured that the products they purchase do, in fact, promote social 
change.  Without the assurance of advertising accuracy, consumers could 
potentially distrust environmentally beneficial products and lose a powerful 
mechanism to positively impact climate change. 
This Note will address the prominence of misleading and deceptive envi-
ronmental claims that have prompted appeals for improved federal regula-
 
 9. See Greg Zimmerman, The Rise and Significance of Eco-Labels and Green Product 
Certifications, FACILITIES NET (July 2005), http://www.facilitiesnet.com/green/article/ 
Certified-Green--3087. 
 10. See Cities and Climate Change: Key Message from the OECD, ORGANISATION FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/12/44272199.pdf. 
 11. Cities and Climate Change, C40 CITIES CLIMATE LEADERSHIP GROUP (2010), 
http://www.c40cities.org/climatechange.jsp. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Michele M. Betsill, Mitigating Climate Change in U.S. Cities: Opportunities 
and Obstacles, 6 LOC. ENV’T 4, 393 (2001) (discussing the “Cities for Climate Protection” 
campaign, which promotes methods municipal governments can use to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions); Martin LaMonica, Cities Take Lead in Climate Change, CNET NEWS (June 
12, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-9963600-54.html. 
 14. Betsill, supra note 13, at 403. 
FLIEGELMAN_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:52 PM 
2010] THE NEXT GENERATION OF GREENWASH 1005 
tion.15  Specifically, the Note will focus on the emerging trend of carbon 
advertising and national and international models that provide guidance on 
preventing deception.  Part I will convey the current status of environmen-
tal advertising and the necessary background principles for establishing 
regulations.  Part II will detail major criticisms of the current environmen-
tal advertising guidelines and proposed models for restructuring environ-
mental advertising regulations.  Finally, Part III will propose a voluntary 
national eco-labeling program that will address the current criticisms and 
improve consumer confidence in environmentally-beneficial product pur-
chases. 
I.  BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING 
Part I conveys the historical, legal, and sociological framework for the 
current green marketing regulations.  First, Part I will examine the socio-
logical trend of increased demand from consumers for green products and 
the corresponding rise in deceptive environmental advertising practices.16  
Part I will next address the governmental authority exercised by the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) to regulate deceptive advertising in general and 
discuss how advertising regulations can overcome First Amendment chal-
lenges.  The current usage of environmental and energy advertising has 
been monitored through third-party product certifications and the FTC’s 
voluntary guidelines on environmental labeling.  Despite the FTC’s author-
ity in this area, one significant aspect of the debate is over which agency 
should ultimately be responsible for environmental labeling regulations.  
Part I thus examines whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
has either express or implied authority to implement environmental adver-
tising regulations, specifically a national eco-labeling program.  Part I pro-
vides both national and international examples of labeling programs that 
have created effective regulatory frameworks to look to for guidance in 
modifying the current state of environmental labeling regulations.  Finally, 
Part I will discuss the newly-emerging issues surrounding environmental 
advertising, specifically the increasing presence of carbon terminology, and 
how any regulatory changes should take into account the new technology 
and terminology to promote effective, accurate product labeling and ulti-
mately increase consumer protection. 
 
 15. See Jennifer Woods, Of Selling the Environment—Buyer Beware? An Evaluation of 
the Proposed F.T.C. Green Guides Revisions, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 75, 75-78 (2008). 
 16. See Luehr, supra note 2, at 313-14; Majoras, supra note 3 (“[C]onsumers are show-
ing increasing interest in environmental issues and, importantly, this interest may be in-
fluencing their purchasing decisions.”). 
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A. The Rise of Green Consumerism and Greenwashing 
The general public’s increasing awareness of climate change created the 
purchasing phenomenon known as “green consumerism,” in which envi-
ronmentally-conscious shoppers purchase products that seemingly pose less 
of an environmental threat.17  A study conducted in 2009 by WPP Green 
Brands18 found that thirty-seven percent of consumers factored the envi-
ronmental attributes of a product into their purchasing decisions, and se-
venty-seven percent of consumers considered a company’s “environmental-
ly-friendly” reputation to be significant.19  As a result, green advertising 
has the potential to produce environmental benefits through greater con-
sumer awareness because it can aid consumers in making meaningful mar-
ketplace choices.20 
The ubiquity of green advertising claims generally increases consumer 
confidence that the claims have been substantiated, such that an individual 
consumer believes he need not worry about conducting independent re-
search to verify the accuracy of green advertising claims.21  However, with 
respect to green advertising, the overwhelming presence of advertisements 
touting environmental benefits has failed to indicate to consumers that the 
claims are accurate.22  Many companies, more concerned with profitability 
than ensuring that products meet specific standards, will “exaggerate or 
even fabricate the environmental qualities of their goods, letting their ad-
vertising rhetoric far outstrip their environmental contributions.”23  These 
 
 17. Roger D. Wynne, Defining Green: Toward Regulation of Environmental Marketing 
Claims, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 785, 785-86 (1991).  For example, “magazines like Vani-
ty Fair have released green issues and retailers like Wal-Mart and Home Deport have 
launched green product lines.” Majoras, supra note 3, at 8-9. 
 18. WPP is a leading advertising and marketing services group that analyzed the re-
search of five marketing companies on critical green trends. See About Us, WPP (2010), 
http://www.wpp.com/wpp/about/. 
 19. Joe Fernandez, Product Claims: The Poisons That Pollutes Your Marketing, MAR-
KETING WK., July 30, 2009, at 16, available at http://www.marketingweek.co.uk/poisons-
that-pollute-marketing/3002855; Press Release, WPP, 2009 Green Brands Survey Published 
(July 22, 2009), available at http://www.wpp.com/wpp/press/press/default.htm?guid={ 
b983b1a9-ab92-4427-b75f-ab35f2565dad}#. 
 20. See Downs, supra note 2, at 158. 
 21. Alan Levy, Senior Scientist, Food & Drug Admin., Remarks at the FTC’s Workshop 
on Carbon Offsets and Renewable Energy Certificates 73 (Jan. 8, 2008). 
 22. Wynne, supra note 17, at 787-88. 
 23. Id. at 787; see also John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some 
Lessons From the Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245, 246 (1994) 
(“[M]anufacturers, striving for greater profits, may have an incentive to inflate or even lie 
about the environmental attributes of their products.”); Luehr, supra note 2, at 313-14 (“As 
competition mounts, so does the tendency of advertisers to make exaggerated or irrelevant 
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companies “often change their labels but little else.”24  Advertisements also 
frequently employ vague, undefined terms like “eco-friendly” or “green,” 
which colloquially imply an environmental benefit, but when used in prod-
uct labeling, “despite their ambiguity . . . imply that they are based upon 
objective scientific investigation.”25  Yet, there is “no absolute measure of 
earth-friendliness.”26  These claims are simply value judgments about the 
overall impact of the product.27  Thus, one of the major critiques of corpo-
rate green advertising is that many are “reap[ing] the benefits of a green 
reputation” without “actually creat[ing] social good” through substantial 
changes to a company’s practices.28 
“Greenwashing”—the buzzword for deception in green advertising—is 
defined as the act of misleading consumers about the environmental prac-
tices of a company or the environmental benefits of a product.29  Initially 
coined in the 1980s, the term was used by environmental activists to critic-
ize a company’s portrayal of itself as environmentally responsible while 
engaging in harmful actions.30  One of the significant risks of greenwashing 
is that consumers will become skeptical and cynical of environmentally-
friendly products.31  Marketing experts agree that the “term green is too 
widespread to have any real marketing clout,” and “has become poisoned 
through overuse.” 32 
To determine the extensiveness of greenwashing, TerraChoice, an envi-
ronmental marketing firm, conducted studies evaluating thousands of prod-
 
claims.”); Mario Teisel, Professor of Econ., Univ. of Me., Remarks at the FTC’s Workshop 
on Carbon Offsets and Renewable Energy Certificates 175 (Jan. 8, 2008). 
 24. Wynne, supra note 17, at 787. 
 25. Id. at 792. 
 26. Id. at 811 (“Broad terms like ‘environmentally responsible,’ therefore possess little 
value; standing alone they are highly subjective, difficult to verify, and tend to create the 
misleading impression that the product poses no harm to the environment.”); see also 
Downs, supra note 2, at 168 (“[V]ague messages such as ‘environment-friendly’ and ‘earth 
safe’ that are unsupported by any claims of specific environmental benefits are also proble-
matic.”). 
 27. See Downs, supra note 2, at 168 (discussing that vague green claims are widely crit-
icized as meaningless and confusing to consumers); Luehr, supra note 2, at 320. 
 28. Jacob Vos, Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Greenwashing in Corporate Ameri-
ca, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 672, 681 (2009); see also Teisel, supra note 
23 (discussing how companies adopt certification seals to improve their corporate image). 
 29. TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTG., GREENWASHING REPORT 2007, at 1 (2007) [hereinafter 
TERRACHOICE, GREENWASHING REPORT 2007], available at http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/ 
findings/greenwashing-report-2007/. 
 30. Fernandez, supra note 19. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
FLIEGELMAN_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:52 PM 
1008 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
ucts and various types of environmental claims.33  In 2007, TerraChoice 
evaluated over 1018 products and found that ninety-nine percent failed to 
“live up fully to their green boasts.”34  Each product committed one of the 
“sins of greenwashing,”35 indicating that the company’s product does not 
fully achieve its claimed environmental benefits.36  In 2009, TerraChoice 
conducted a follow-up study of 2219 products making 4996 green claims 
and found that over ninety-eight percent committed at least one of the 
greenwashing sins.37  An example of the “sin of the hidden trade-off” is 
when a company advertises that its paper towels are made from a sustaina-
bly harvested forest, while the manufacturer’s shipping to global markets 
causes extensive greenhouse gas emissions.38  The “sin of fibbing” was 
found in numerous products falsely claiming to be Energy Star certified or 
certified by a private organization.39  For example, in a House subcommit-
tee hearing, Scot Case, Vice President of TerraChoice, described how one 
consumer purchased an LG Energy Star certified refrigerator in 2007, but 
in 2009, received a letter stating that his refrigerator did not qualify for 
Energy Star status and that the company had certified the product any-
way.40  The “sin” on the rise is “worshipping false labels,” where a product, 
either through words or images, gives an impression that it possesses bene-
ficial environmental attributes or private certification where none exist.41  
With increasing frequency, manufacturers are using the color green in a 
product’s packaging, such as a green bottle cap, an image of a tree, or a 
green thumbs-up to create a subliminal message.42 
 
 33. See About Us, TERRACHOICE (2009), 
http://www.terrachoice.com/Home/About%20Us. 
 34. Bryan Walsh, Eco Buyer Beware, TIME, Sept. 22, 2008, at 71; see TERRACHOICE, 
GREENWASHING REPORT 2007, supra note 29; see also Woods, supra note 15, at 82. 
 35. According to TerraChoice, the “seven sins” are: (1) Sin of the Hidden Trade-off; (2) 
Sin of No Proof; (3) Sin of Vagueness; (4) Sin of Worshipping False Labels; (5) Sin of Irre-
levance; (6) Sin of Lesser of Two Evils; and (7) Sin of Fibbing. See The Seven Sins of 
Greenwashing, TERRRACHOICE (2010), http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/findings/the-seven-
sins/; see also David Gibson, Awash in Green: A Critical Perspective on Environmental Ad-
vertising, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 425 (2009). 
 36. Gibson, supra note 35, at 424. 
 37. TERRACHOICE, GREENWASHING REPORT 2009, supra note 4, at 3. 
 38. Walsh, supra note 34. 
 39. Karen Goldberg Goff, Green with Honesty, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at B01. 
 40. It’s Too Easy Being Green: Defining Fair Green Marketing Practices: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce, 111th Cong. 9 (2009) (statement of Scot Case, Vice President, Terra-
Choice). 
 41. TERRACHOICE, GREENWASHING REPORT 2009, supra note 4, at 5. 
 42. Id.  At the June 9, 2009 subcommittee hearings, Representative Gringrey echoed this 
sentiment, stating that simply using the color green on a product, even without “saying any-
thing about being environmentally friendly,” gives consumers a “subliminal message.” It’s 
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Consumer education on the extensiveness of greenwashing has had a 
substantial impact.  Sixty-eight percent of adults now believe that most 
companies are greenwashing their advertising claims.43  One company, 
promoting the “Greenwashing Index,”44 is encouraging consumers to play 
an active role in monitoring advertising claims by identifying instances of 
greenwashing.45  One of the most notoriously criticized advertisements has 
been Fiji’s claim that it is the first bottled water company to go “carbon 
negative.”46  According to Fiji, purchasing a bottle of water actually reduc-
es carbon emissions.47  Visitors of the Greenwashing Index have called the 
advertising campaign an “outright falsehood,” done simply to increase Fi-
ji’s reputation.48  General Electric global executive director of advertising 
and marketing, Judy Hu, admitted that reputation, rather than environmen-
tal benefit, is often a company’s main concern.49  “It is about a business 
opportunity,” she said, “[g]reen is green as in the color of money.”50 
Going green may be trendy, but proponents of environmental change 
through selective purchasing have raised the concern that “the sudden 
‘over-hyping’ by the media of going green twists its message and turns en-
vironmentalism into a marketing tag.”51  They argue that increasing fami-
liarity with the prevalence of greenwashing will make it increasingly diffi-
cult to mislead consumers, who will “be able to see through the green fog 
that has been created.”52 
 
Too Easy Being Green: Defining Fair Green Marketing Practices: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Rep. Phil Gingrey, Member, H. Comm. on Ener-
gy and Commerce). 
 43. See Goff, supra note 39. 
 44. Greenwashing Index, ENVIROMEDIA SOCIAL MARKETING (2010), http://www.green 
washingindex.com/. 
 45. The Ads, ENVIROMEDIA SOCIAL MARKETING (2010), http://www.greenwashing 
index.com/ads.php. 
 46. Kimberly Maul, Fiji Water Has Its Consumers Seeing Green, PR WK., May 5, 2008, 
at 7, available at http://www.prweekus.com/Fiji-Water-has-its-consumers-seeing-green/ 
article/109561/. 
 47. Fiji Green: Our Path to Sustainability, FIJI (2009), 
http://www.fijiwater.sg/Sustainability.aspx.  Fiji’s factories do not operate solely on renew-
able energy and they still use planes and trucks to transport their products.  Their claim is 
based on a concept of “forward crediting,” by investing in carbon negative projects like re-
forestation and renewable energy initiatives. See Maul, supra note 46. 
 48. Walsh, supra note 34. 
 49. Gibson, supra note 35, at 426. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Purple Romero, Beware of Green Marketing Warns Greenpeace Exec, ABS-CBN 
NEWS, Sept. 17, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/special-report/ 
09/16/08/beware-green-marketing-warns-greenpeace-exec. 
 52. Goff, supra note 39. 
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B. Deceptive Advertising: Applying the FTC Framework to Green 
Advertising 
Though many companies have honestly advertised the environmental 
attributes of their products, the threat of deceptive, misleading, and false 
advertisements by other companies continues to affect consumers.53  The 
FTC is the federal agency tasked with tackling deceptive advertising gener-
ally, and enforcing green advertising violations specifically.54 
To address issues of consumer protection in the marketplace, Congress 
passed the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA),55 which empowered 
the FTC to “prevent unfair methods of competition and unfair and decep-
tive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”56  To implement that mis-
sion, the FTCA permits the FTC to “prescribe trade regulation rules defin-
ing with specificity acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and 
establishing requirements designed to prevent such acts or practices.”57  
“The FTC and the Courts have interpreted this power to include the author-
ity to regulate false and misleading advertising and marketing claims.”58  
Section 5 of the FTCA specifically prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.”59  A violation of a regulation passed under Section 5 constitutes 
an automatic violation that has corresponding consequences.60  The FTC 
can also pass voluntary guidelines for an industry, but these require the 
FTC to prove on a case-by-case basis that the company’s practice would 
likely deceive consumers.61 
Section 12 of the FTCA “prohibits false ads likely to induce the pur-
chase of food, drugs, devices or cosmetics.  Section 15 defines a false ad 
for purposes of Section 12 as one which is ‘misleading in a material re-
 
 53. TERRACHOICE, GREENWASHING REPORT 2009, supra note 4, at 3. 
 54. Sorting Out ‘Green’ Claims, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Apr. 1999), http://www.ftc. 
gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/general/gen02.shtm. 
 55. Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006)). 
 56. Legal Resources: Statutes Relating to Both Missions, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (June 
19, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/stat1.shtm. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Glenn Israel, Taming the Green Marketing Monster: National Standards for Envi-
ronmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 303, 309-10 (1993). 
 59. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, sec. 3, 52 Stat. 111 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) 
(1994)). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Appendix 1—Laws Enforced by the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (June 25, 2007), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gpra/append1.shtm. 
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spect.’”62  Congress did not provide a definition for “unfair” or “deceptive” 
in the FTCA which potentially could have clarified when an advertisement 
is misleading.63  The FTC issued the FTC Policy Statement on Deception64 
(“Deception Policy”) which provides a broader explanation of the terms.  
The Deception Policy states three required elements for deception.65  First, 
there must be a representation, omission, or practice likely to mislead the 
consumer.66  Second, the practice must be examined from the perspective 
of a consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.67  Finally, the 
practice must be material, meaning it is likely to affect the consumer’s con-
duct or decision with regard to the product.68 
The Deception Policy was created in response to the decision in In re 
Cliffdale Associates, Inc.,69 which struck down the long-standing definition 
that an advertisement was deceptive so long as it had a capacity or tenden-
cy to deceive.70  The Deception Policy narrowed the definition by introduc-
ing a three-pronged test. 71  Under the first element, actual, explicit decep-
tion is not necessary; rather, a deceptive claim can arise either expressly or 
 
 62. Federal Trade Commission Policy Statement on Deception, appended to In re Cliff-
dale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 1984 FTC LEXIS 71, at *167 (1984) [hereinafter Policy 
Statement on Deception]. 
 63. Id. at *167-68; see Church, supra note 23, at 296; Wynne, supra note 17, at 789. 
 64. Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 62. 
 65. See Church, supra note 23, at 298. 
 66. In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 1984 FTC LEXIS 71, at *79 (1984) (“It is 
well settled that any advertising representation that has the tendency and capacity to mislead 
or deceive a prospective purchaser is an unfair and deceptive practice which violated the 
Federal Trade Commission Act.”); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 561 F.2d 
357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[T]he Commission was entitled to conclude from the adver-
tisements themselves and the stipulations of fact that the ads had a tendency and capacity to 
mislead consumers.”); Church, supra note 23, at 299. 
 67. Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 62, at *79 (“Determination as to whether 
an advertiser possessed and relied upon a ‘reasonable basis’ for believing a representation to 
be true requires evaluation of ‘both the reasonableness of an advertiser’s action and the ade-
quacy of the evidence upon which such actions were based.’”). 
 68. See Church, supra note 23, at 298. 
 69. 1984 FTC LEXIS 71, at *104 (“[T]he Commission will find an act or practice de-
ceptive if, first, there is a representation, omission, or practice that, second, is likely to mis-
lead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and third, the representation, 
omission, or practice is material.”). 
 70. See Simeon v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(“[A]dvertisements capable of being interpreted in a misleading way should be construed 
against the advertiser.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Goodman v. Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, 244 F.2d 584, 602 (9th Cir. 1957) (noting that one purpose of the FTCA is to 
eliminate business practices that could deceive consumers); Wynne, supra note 17, at 790. 
 71. See Wynne, supra note 17, at 790. 
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impliedly.72  Whether a claim is implicitly deceptive is determined by “eva-
luating the contents of the advertisement and the circumstances surround-
ing it.”73  The second element of the FTC test is the advertisement’s ability 
to mislead consumers.  This element considers the percentage of people 
who would view the advertisement as deceptive in order to determine 
whether a consumer acted reasonably under the circumstances.74  Surveys 
of consumer perception are often the most important evidence in establish-
ing this element.75  If a claim meets the first and second elements, the court 
next looks to whether the representation is material.76  Materiality requires 
that the claim affects consumers’ choices.77  Both literally false and literal-
ly true but misleading advertisements can be actionable so long as the ad-
vertisement materially misleads consumers, meaning that the “consumer 
would perceive some important message that differs from the reality of the 
product.”78 
While misleading advertisements are actionable, they “must be distin-
guished from the non-actionable, vague, subjective assertions common in 
ads, known as puffery.”79  The Cliffdale decision that found puffery inac-
tionable has been reaffirmed in subsequent decisions in federal courts.80  
 
 72. See Church, supra note 23, at 299 (noting that “express claims speak for them-
selves,” while implied claims are evaluated based on “the contents of the advertisement and 
the circumstances surrounding it”). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Cliffdale, 1984 FTC LEXIS 71, at *105; Church, supra note 23, at 300. 
 75. Carter Dillard, False Advertising, Animals, and Ethical Consumption, 10 ANIMAL L. 
25, 55 (2004).  Surveys will be scrutinized based on whether: 
[1] the population was properly chosen and defined; [2] the sample chosen was 
representative of that population; [3] the data gathered were accurately reported []; 
[4] the data were analyzed in accordance with accepted statistical principles . . . [;] 
[5] the questions asked were clear and not leading; [6] the survey was conducted 
by qualified persons following proper interview procedures; and [7] the process 
was conducted so as to ensure objectivity (e.g., was the survey conducted in antic-
ipation of litigation and by persons connected with the parties or counsel or aware 
of its purpose in the litigation?). 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 21.493 (1995). 
 76. Cliffdale, 1984 FTC LEXIS 71, at *107. 
 77. In re Am. Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. 136, 1981 FTC LEXIS 1, at *14 (1973) (“[T]he 
existence of such a substantial question is a material fact, which, if known to consumers, 
would be likely to affect their consideration of whether or not to purchase such products.”); 
see Church, supra note 23, at 301. 
 78. Dillard, supra note 75, at 50-51.  For example, “a package that was labeled ‘Potato 
Chips’ but in fact contained chips that were made from dried potato granules, as opposed to 
raw potatoes, was held to constitute false advertising.” Id. at 51. 
 79. Id. at 51. 
 80. See In re Southwest Sunsites, 105 F.T.C. 7, 1980 FTC LEXIS 86, at *324 (1985) 
(“The Commission stated in Cliffdale that an act or practice is deceptive if it consists of a 
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The concept asserts that a statement is “merely puffery,” rather than “de-
ceptive,” if one “cannot refute the message with objective evidence.”81  
Thus, questions for green advertising include: “When is a green marketing 
claim unlawful?  [And] [h]ow far can manufacturers stretch the truth of va-
gue terms like ‘environmentally friendly’ before they enter the realm of de-
ceptiveness?”82 
C. Commercial Speech: First Amendment Challenges to Advertising 
Regulation 
Manufacturers and industry groups have opposed advertising regulations 
specifically pertaining to product labeling on the grounds that it is a First 
Amendment violation of their commercial speech rights.83  Interpretations 
of the First Amendment can therefore impact the creation of a national eco-
labeling program, particularly one that contains specific definitions of envi-
ronmental terms.84 
1. The Legal Precedent for Commercial Speech Regulations 
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc.,85 the Supreme Court held “for the first time that speech 
which does nothing more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled 
to First Amendment Protection.”86  The Court reasoned that commercial 
advertising is a form of protected expression because it aids intelligent and 
informed choices by consumers.87  The Court further clarified the meaning 
of “commercial speech” in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,88 by outlining 
factors that distinguish commercial speech.89 
 
representation, omission or practice that is both material and likely to mislead consumers 
acting reasonably under the circumstances.”); see also Wynne, supra note 17, at 790. 
 81. Dillard, supra note 75, at 51. 
 82. Wynne, supra note 17, at 803. 
 83. Id. at 813; see also Jamie Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of Envi-
ronmental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 147, 183 (1993). 
 84. See Grodsky, supra note 83, at 184. 
 85. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 86. David Hoch & Robert Franz, Legal Developments: Eco-Porn Versus the Constitu-
tion: Commercial Speech and the Regulation of Environmental Advertising, 58 ALB. L. REV. 
441, 447 (1994) (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). 
 87. Id. (discussing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-65, describing that socie-
ty “may have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information”). 
 88. 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
 89. These factors include: (1) whether money is spent to project it; (2) whether the 
speech is carried in a publication sold for profit; (3) whether the speech solicits money; or 
(4) whether the speech is on a commercial subject. Peter J. Tarsney, Note, Regulation of En-
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The Court established a four prong test to determine the constitutionality 
of restrictions on commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission.90  There, the issue was whether New 
York’s ban on promotional advertising by electric utilities violated the First 
Amendment.91  The Court held that for commercial speech to be protected 
by the First Amendment it must: first, “concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading;” second, the regulation must be supported by a substantial 
government interest; third, the law must directly advance the asserted gov-
ernment interest; and finally, the regulation cannot be more extensive than 
necessary to accomplish the government interest.92  In Board of Trustees v. 
Fox,93 the Court diluted the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test by in-
terpreting it to “employ not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a 
means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”94  Despite the 
First Amendment protection that is granted to commercial speech, false or 
misleading commercial speech is excluded from any such protection.95 
The most recent challenge pitting environmental advertising regulations 
against commercial speech protection arose in Association of National Ad-
vertisers, Inc. v. Lungren.96  In 1992, the Association of National Advertis-
ers (“Association”) filed a suit against the California Attorney General 
challenging a California statute97 that defined several environmental terms 
and regulated their use in product advertising unless they met the statutory 
definition.98  The Association claimed the statute violated its commercial 
 
vironmental Marketing: Reassessing the Supreme Court’s Protection of Commercial 
Speech, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 533, 551-52 (1994); see also Bd. of Tr. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 
469, 477 (1989); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 
376, 385 (1973) (defining commercial speech as speech that does “no more than propose a 
commercial transaction”). 
 90. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 91. Id. at 560; Tarsney, supra note 89, at 548. 
 92. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 93. 492 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 94. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (“What our decisions require is a ‘fit’ between the legislature’s 
ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,—a fit that is not necessarily perfect, 
but reasonable.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Brett B. Coffee, Environmental Mar-
keting After Association of National Advertisers v. Lungren: Still Searching For An Im-
proved Regulatory Framework, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 324-25 (1995); Tarsney, 
supra note 89, at 550. 
 95. Coffee, supra note 94, at 315 (“Commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment 
protection only if the speech is not misleading.”); Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends On What the 
Meaning of False Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 227, 227 (2007) (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566). 
 96. 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 97. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17508 (West 1995). 
 98. See Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 727; Coffee, supra note 94, at 300-01. 
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speech rights under the First Amendment.99  The Association argued that 
the statute “threw the regulatory requirements of national marketers into 
disorder and confusion” and created an “onerous burden on their ability to 
effectively communicate with the public.”100  The Ninth Circuit evaluated 
the statute under the Central Hudson test and concluded that California’s 
interest in environmental and consumer protection was directly promoted 
by the statute.101  The State sought to protect against the legitimate concern 
of the “direct, predictable and ongoing result of green marketing—
increased sales of goods as a result of potentially specious claims or eco-
logical puffery about products with minimal environmental attributes.”102  
Furthermore, the Court stated that “the statute increases consumer know-
ledge and awareness and discourages exploitation and deception”103 be-
cause the monitoring provides a protective function that the average con-
sumer cannot sufficiently perform.104 
2. Overcoming First Amendment Limitations 
Based on the decision in Association of National Advertisers v. Califor-
nia, it is likely that the First Amendment would not pose a major obstacle 
to promulgating enforceable environmental advertising regulations.105  The 
Supreme Court has upheld other labeling legislation, such as the Organic 
Food and Production Act and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, 
which suggests that “courts generally defer to regulatory limitations on 
commercial speech that fall short of comprehensive bans on advertis-
ing.”106  In fact, the Supreme Court has even upheld federal labeling laws 
that compel commercial speech, such as provisions requiring manufacturers 
to provide explicit warnings to consumers.107  These laws extend far 
 
 99. See Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 728; Coffee, supra note 94, at 301. 
 100. Coffee, supra note 94, at 310-11. 
 101. See Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 735. 
 102. Id.; see also Coffee, supra note 94, at 331. 
 103. Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 733. 
 104. See Coffee, supra note 94, at 331. 
 105. Kimberly C. Cavanagh, It’s A Lorax Kind of Market! But Is It A Sneetches Kind of 
Solution?: A Critical Review of Current Laissez-Faire Environmental Marketing Regula-
tion, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 133, 193-94 (1998); see also Grodsky, supra note 83, at 184-85 
(“The First Amendment should not present a major barrier to environmental labeling sta-
tutes.”). 
 106. Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); Grodsky, supra note 83, at 185-86 
(citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569-70 
(1980)). 
 107. This is known as mandatory, negative content labeling. See Elliot B. Staffin, Trade 
Barrier or Trade Boon? A Critical Evaluation of Environmental Labeling and Its Role in the 
“Greening” of World Trade, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 211 (1996).  A government man-
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beyond the voluntary frameworks that have been suggested for environ-
mental advertising. 
Using the Central Hudson framework, an environmental labeling 
scheme is likely to meet the first prong because deceptive speech is not 
protected by the First Amendment.108  Environmental advertising terms 
“implying general environmental benefits . . . are arguably deceptive per 
se.”109  Furthermore, such regulations would encourage well-informed de-
cisions in the marketplace because they are created to ensure accuracy and 
enhance “the market’s ability to serve as a mechanism not only of individ-
ual benefit to consumers and manufacturers, but also of environmental im-
provement.”110  Next, it is likely a court would give considerable deference 
to such advertising regulations because they concern potentially misleading 
speech.111  Also, the government has a substantial interest in both protect-
ing citizens from deceptive advertising, and promoting environmental poli-
cy.112  Finally, environmental regulation is not only designed to achieve the 
government’s interest, but “[l]abeling laws that establish minimum thre-
sholds . . . are far less restrictive than . . . laws that require manufacturers to 
meet or exceed” specific requirements.113  Manufacturers are only required 
to comply with the statute if they choose to make environmental claims for 
their products.114 
D. The Current Framework for Environmental Advertising 
1. Third Party Environmental Certification 
Numerous private certification companies have emerged to fill the void 
created by the lack of government regulations.115  Private companies have 
put forth their own standards for what constitutes an “environmentally-
friendly” product and award a certification seal of approval to a product 
that meets their specific standards.116  These seals are intended to provide 
 
dated program requires product labeling prior to a sale that contains an environmentally 
harmful substance. Id.  In the United States, the Clean Air Act requires products that contain 
chlorofluocarbons to have a warning label. Id.; see also Grodsky, supra note 83, at 185. 
 108. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Tushnet, supra note 95. 
 109. Grodsky, supra note 83, at 187. 
 110. Wynne, supra note 17, at 815. 
 111. See Grodsky, supra note 83, at 187. 
 112. See id. at 187-88. 
 113. Id. at 189. 
 114. See id. at 190. 
 115. See Downs, supra note 2, at 172. 
 116. See id. at 173. 
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verification to consumers that a product meets certain standards established 
by the organization.117 
Because adopting an eco-seal is voluntary, a company’s labeling initia-
tive can indicate to consumers that the company is genuinely concerned 
with improving the environmental attributes of its products.118  As dis-
cussed above, with consumers’ increased desire to make socially responsi-
ble choices in their purchases, private certification may increase consumer 
interest in the product. 
Currently, there are two prominent eco-labeling programs that provide 
certification to companies and products with general environmental bene-
fits.119  “Both seal programs attempt to provide accurate information to 
consumers about the environmental impact of products, while encouraging 
manufacturers to develop more environmentally sound products.”120  In 
1989, Green Seal founded the first United States environmental seal of ap-
proval program.121  Green Seal is an independent, non-profit organization 
dedicated to “protecting the environment by promoting the manufacture 
and sale of environmentally responsible consumer products.”122  Green 
Seal grants a certification mark to products satisfying predetermined envi-
ronmental criteria.123  Once a product is certified, a manufacturer pays a fee 
to Green Seal and can then use the seal of approval on their product.124  
The second company, Green Cross, now known as Scientific Certification 
Systems (SCS), issues an “Environmental Report Card,” a content-neutral 
scheme that is designed solely to convey information about a product’s en-
vironmental impact.125  SCS determines which product categories to test 
and conducts an analysis to quantify a product’s significant outputs during 
each stage of its life cycle.126 
While these certifications can provide information to a consumer, often 
they are a consumer’s “only clue to the product’s environmental impact” 
 
 117. See Zimmerman, supra note 9.  Home Depot, for example, adopted a labeling initia-
tive in 2007, transfixing an Eco Options brand label to approximately three thousand prod-
ucts. See Church, supra note 23, at 287-88 (“When consumers doubt a seller’s claim,  a third 
party evaluation or certification may . . . [have] the seller [rely] on the reputation of the third 
party evaluator.”). 
 118. See Church, supra note 23, at 287. 
 119. See Downs, supra note 2, at 172. 
 120. Israel, supra note 58, at 322. 
 121. See Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 201-02. 
 122. Id. at 201. 
 123. See id. at 202. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Staffin, supra note 107, at 230-32. 
 126. See id. at 233. 
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prior to the purchase.127  Though the FTC issues consumer guides to pro-
vide advice on environmental claims, about one in three consumers still as-
sert that they do not know how to tell if green product claims are true.128 
2. FTC’s Framework: The Green Guides 
a. History of the Green Guides 
Responding to public pressure to address the rise of deceptive environ-
mental advertising, the FTC created the Guides for the Use of Environmen-
tal Claims (“Green Guides” or “Guides”) in 1992.129  The National Associ-
ation of Attorney Generals (NAAG), a group of state attorney generals,130 
published the Green Report,131 which called “specifically for federal defini-
tions of environmental marketing terms, federal testing protocols . . . and 
strong federal involvement.”132  Even major corporations and manufactur-
ers advocated for binding regulations and uniform standards to provide 
“national consistency” and “sufficient incentive for manufacturers to pro-
duce better products.”133 
 
 127. Downs, supra note 2, at 173. 
 128. See id. at 167 n.52. 
 129. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363 (Aug. 
13, 1992) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 260 (1994), revised by 61 Fed. Reg. 53,311 (1996)); see 
also FTC Chairman Steiger Announces National Guidelines to Prevent Misleading Envi-
ronmental Marketing Claims, Fed. Trade Comm’n, July 28, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter FTC 
Chairman Steiger], available at http://www.p2pays.org/ref/32/31545.pdf.  The Green 
Guides were based on the FTC’s review of data obtained from investigations, FTC hearings, 
and public comments. Summary of FTC Environmental Marketing Guidelines, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, July 28, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Summary of Guidelines], available at 
http://www.p2pays.org/ref/32/31545.pdf. 
 130. The NAAG was composed of eight State Attorney Generals who formed an ad hoc 
task force and sponsored a public forum where forty different organizations testified about 
standards for environmental advertising. See Luehr, supra note 2, at 314, 336 n.18. 
 131. CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL ET AL., THE GREEN REPORT: FINDINGS AND PRELIM-
INARY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ADVERTISING (1990) [hereinafter THE GREEN 
REPORT].  In May 1991, after holding additional hearings, the Task Force issued a second 
Green Report, which combined the findings. CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL ET AL., THE 
GREEN REPORT II: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING 
(1991) [hereinafter THE GREEN REPORT II]; see also Jeremy Abidiwan-Lupo, The Green 
Marketing Machine: Tackling Green Advertising in the Automobile Industry, 27 TEMP. J. 
SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 359, 363-64 (2009). 
 132. THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 131, at iv; see also Israel, supra note 58, at 317-18; 
Manufacturers, Retailers Petition FTC to Adopt Uniform Labeling Guidelines, ANTITRUST 
& TRADE REG. REP., Feb. 21, 1991, at 279. 
 133. Israel, supra note 58, at 318. 
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While the FTC considered developing environmental regulations,134 en-
vironmentalists petitioned the EPA to develop scientific standards and de-
finitions “capable of advancing a policy of environmental protection while 
preventing consumer deception.”135  The EPA responded by announcing 
plans to formulate voluntary national guidelines.136  The EPA proposed to: 
“(1) establish standards for the legitimate use of environmental claims; (2) 
determine the environmental benefits of various products; and (3) aid gov-
ernment officials and manufacturers in applying a life-cycle product as-
sessment.”137 
Also during this period, two bills were proposed in the Senate authoriz-
ing the EPA to “create voluntary national guidelines for environmental 
marketing terminology.”138  The bills required the EPA to set definitional 
standards and mandated a public education program to raise awareness of 
environmental marketing.139  However, the bills did not garner enough 
congressional support and both died in the Senate.140 
Following congressional defeat of the bills, the FTC announced its pub-
lication of the Green Guides.141  The emergence of FTC Guides “squelched 
all attempts to put EPA at the helm of the environmental marketing move-
ment.”142  In its announcement, the FTC “underscored the difference be-
tween its goals and those of the EPA,”143 namely that “the Guides are nei-
ther based on nor intended to implement environmental policy.”144  FTC 
Chairwoman Janet Steiger further stated that any environmental impact 
 
 134. The FTC held its own hearings in July 1991 on the issue of environmental marketing 
regulations. See Sunshine Act Meetings, Public Hearings Concerning Environmental Claims 
and Product Labeling and Marketing, 56 Fed. Reg. 32,472 (July 16, 1991).  Following the 
publication of the Guides, the FTC sought public comment and the subsequent revisions 
were published on October 11, 1996. 
 135. Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 162. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 160; see also Grodsky, supra note 83, at 166 (“The proposed Environmental 
Marketing Claims Act would have directed the EPA to verify that each environmental mar-
keting claim is related to a ‘specific’ environmental impact to ensure that it is not false, mis-
leading or deceptive, and that it has been scientifically substantiated.”). 
 139. See Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 160-61. 
 140. See id. at 161. 
 141. See The Green Guides, supra note 129; FTC Chairman Steiger, supra note 129.  
The Green Guides were based on the FTC’s review of data obtained from investigations, 
FTC hearings, and public comments. See The Green Guides, supra note 129. 
 142. Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 142. 
 143. Id. at 163 (citing Petitions for Environmental Marketing and Advertising Guides: 
Public Hearings, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,968 (1991)). 
 144. Relating to the Federal Trade Commission’s Guides for the Use of Environmental 
Marketing Claims, Fed. Trade Comm’n, July 28, 1992, at 3, available at 
http://www.p2pays.org/ref/32/31545.pdf. 
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would be minimized because the Green Guides are simply voluntary guide-
lines.145 Instead, they are merely intended to promote “voluntary com-
pliance with such laws by members of industry.”146  Because the guidelines 
are voluntary, environmental claims are evaluated under the same standard 
of typical deceptive trade practices and result in FTC action only if the 
practices directly violate enforceable statutory provisions.147  By rejecting 
the EPA’s environmental expertise, “put simply, the agency with enforce-
ment expertise lacks the appropriate mission, and the agency with the mis-
sion lacks enforcement authority.”148 
b. The Green Guides’ Requirements for Environmental Claims 
The Green Guides state that “it is deceptive to misrepresent, directly or 
by implication, that a product, package, or service offers a general envi-
ronmental benefit.”149  Any environmental qualifications or disclosures for 
a product must be made “sufficiently clear and prominent,”150 and manu-
facturers must clarify whether a claim applies to a product, its packaging, 
or a service.151  Furthermore, an environmental claim is not permitted to 
overstate a benefit and an advertisement comparing products is required to 
state a substantiated basis.152 
Additionally, the Guides elaborate on six categories pertaining to recy-
cling, waste management, and depletion of the ozone layers,153 which were 
the prominent environmental terms used in green advertising during the 
1990s.  The product categories provide obscure definitions for terms like 
“biodegradable,” “compostable,” “recyclable,” and “ozone friendly.”154  
 
 145. Id. at 4; Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 364 (“While the Guide uses a strong and 
commanding tone, the provisions contained therein are not enforceable and have no lawful 
force or effect.”). 
 146. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. § 260.1 (1996); 
see also Jeremy Rosen, Requirements for Environmental Marketing Claims Under the Fed-
eral Trade Commission’s Guidelines, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 241, 243 (1997). 
 147. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.5 (1996). 
 148. Grodsky, supra note 83, at 176. 
 149. 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(a) (1996); see Summary of Guidelines, supra note 129, at 1-2. 
 150. Summary of Guidelines, supra note 129, at 1. 
 151. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(a) (1996); see also Summary of Guidelines, supra note 129, at 
2. 
 152. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.6(d) (1996); see also Rosen, supra note 146, at 244; Summary 
of Guidelines, supra note 129, at 2. 
 153. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(a)-(h); see also Gregory Bibler et al., Making the Case for 
Your Green Marketing Claims, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING (Sept. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=66476 (describing the categories 
of claims discussed in the Guides). 
 154. 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(b)-(h). 
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The terms are intentionally vague because the definitions are not scientific, 
but instead are based on the FTC’s belief of possible “reasonable interpre-
tations” of the terms to consumers.155  Broad claims are thus considered 
deceptive only when a claim cannot be substantiated at all by any scientific 
evidence.156 
E. The EPA’s Authority to Regulate Environmental Advertising 
Because environmental advertising regulations require an “intricate 
weaving of environmental policy and consumer protection principles,” the 
question arises whether the EPA has the authority to implement advertising 
regulations and an eco-labeling program without overstepping its congres-
sional mandate.157 
Currently, the EPA is the chief enforcement agency for five main 
areas,158 and in each of these areas, the Agency has promulgated labeling 
regulations.159  For example, the Solid Waste Disposal Act prompted a 
labeling directive requiring lubricating oil to bear a statement urging recy-
cling to promote the minimization of hazardous waste.160  The EPA also 
promulgated labeling regulations pertaining to ozone depletion in response 
to the Clean Air Act of 1990.161 
One prominent EPA labeling program is ENERGY STAR (“Energy 
Star”), a voluntary labeling program that awards companies the label when 
they meet the established criteria for energy efficiency.162  Energy Star was 
established and is regulated jointly by the EPA and the United States De-
partment of Energy (DOE) without congressional authorization.163  The 
goals of Energy Star are to provide consumers with energy efficient prod-
 
 155. Woods, supra note 15, at 78. 
 156. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.5 (1996); see also Policy Statement Regarding Advertising 
Substantiation Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 30,999-31,003 (Aug. 2. 1984); Woods, supra note 15, 
at 78 (stating that one commissioner explained that the Guides require acceptance of any 
and all reasonable interpretations). 
 157. Grodsky, supra note 83, at 172. 
 158. The five main areas are: (1) compliance with vehicle emissions standards; (2) 
placement of warning labels on ozone-detrimental products; (3) participation in the national 
recycling and emissions reduction program; (4) elimination of nonessential products con-
taining chlorofluorocarbons; and (5) greenhouse gas emissions. See Cavanagh, supra note 
105, at 164-65. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See 42 U.S.C. § 7671(j) (1998); Staffin, supra note 107, at 213. 
 162. See Stacey O’Neill, Consuming for the Environment: A Proposal for Carbon Labels 
in the U.S., 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 393, 406 (2009). 
 163. See History of Energy Star, ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c= 
about.ab_history (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). 
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ucts,164 and to “identify and promote energy-efficient products to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.”165  To implement these goals, the DOE sets 
minimum energy efficiency requirements for each product category.166  
The program then partners with manufacturers of the products that are eli-
gible for Energy Star certification.167  Manufacturers can seek Energy Star 
certification by making a set of commitments that their products meet the 
energy efficiency criteria.168  The EPA signs a Memorandum of Under-
standing with the manufacturer that outlines the responsibilities of each 
party, provides the manufacturer with the Energy Star approval logo, and 
adds the manufacturer to a published list of certified products and compa-
nies.169 
To date, over twelve thousand private and public organizations have 
partnered with Energy Star.170  Energy Star labels appear on over sixty 
product categories and thousands of products in the United States.171  The 
success of the program is apparent not only by the high participation in this 
voluntary program, but in the recorded cost savings of seventeen billion 
dollars in 2009 alone.172  An additional success is consumer recognition 
and awareness of the label: seventy-six percent of households now recog-
nize the Energy Star label, and of that percentage, seventy-eight percent 
had a high or general understanding of the label’s purpose.173  “By increas-
ing consumer awareness and facilitating the purchase of energy efficient 
products, the Energy Star program has likely generated significant reduc-
tions in greenhouse gas emissions.”174  The expansiveness of the Energy 
Star labeling program and its focus on energy efficiency through the reduc-
 
 164. See id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Staffin, supra note 107, at 214-15.  The list of appliances includes refrigerators, 
freezers, water heaters, air conditioners, heat pumps, washers, dishwashers, furnaces, lamps, 
showerheads, faucets, and water closets. See Find Energy Star Products, ENERGY STAR, 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=products.pr_find_es_products (last visited Sept. 29, 
2010). 
 167. See Michael A. Livermore, Reviving Environmental Protection: Preference-
Directed Regulation and Regulatory Ossification, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 328 (2007); see 
also Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 167. 
 168. See Livermore, supra note 167. 
 169. Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 167-68; see also Livermore, supra note 167. 
 170. O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 416; History of Energy Star, supra note 163. 
 171. History of Energy Star, supra note 163. 
 172. Id. 
 173. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AWARENESS OF ENERGY STAR FOR 2008: 
ANALYSIS OF CEE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ES1 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.energy 
star.gov/ia/partners/publications/pubdocs/National%20Awareness%20of%20ENERGY%20
STAR%202008%20to%20EPA_4-9-09.pdf. 
 174. Livermore, supra note 167, at 329. 
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tion of greenhouse gas emissions implies that the EPA has the authority to 
implement a national labeling program to educate and incentivize consum-
ers to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Despite its commitment to the Energy Star program, in Massachusetts v. 
EPA,175 the EPA argued that the Clean Air Act176 neither authorized the 
EPA to address climate change nor gave it the statutory authority to regu-
late greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.177  In this case, a group 
of states, local governments, and private organizations brought suit against 
the EPA for “abdicat[ing] its responsibility under the Clean Air Act to re-
gulate the emissions of four greenhouse gases, including carbon dio-
xide.”178  The Clean Air Act provides that the EPA administrator should 
create standards for the emissions of any air pollutant from any class of 
new motor vehicles.179  The Act defines “air pollutant” to include “any air 
pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, 
chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter which is admitted 
into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”180  The EPA, however, denied 
that it had the authority to regulate carbon dioxide as an air pollutant be-
cause “carbon dioxide is not an air pollutant as that term is defined in § 
7602.”181  The Supreme Court disagreed and found that that carbon dioxide 
was included in the “Clean Air Act’s sweeping definition of ‘air pollu-
tant.’”182  The Court held that “[c]arbon dioxide . . . [is] without a doubt [a] 
‘physical [and] chemical . . . substance which [is] emitted into . . . the am-
bient air.’  The statute is unambiguous.”183  Accordingly, the Court held 
that “[b]ecause greenhouse gases fit well within the Clean Air Act’s capa-
cious definition of ‘air pollutant’ . . . [the] EPA has the statutory authority 
to regulate the emission of greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles.”184  
Although the ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA specifically pertained to the 
regulation of new motor vehicles, it is significant to note that the Supreme 
 
 175. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 176. “The Clean Air Act is the comprehensive federal law that regulates air emissions 
from stationary and mobile sources. . . . Section 112 of the Clean Air Act addresses emis-
sions of hazardous air pollutants.” Summary of the Clean Air Act, ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, Feb. 12, 2010, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/caa.html. 
 177. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505; O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 427-28. 
 178. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505; O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 427. 
 179. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 506 (citing the Clean Air Act, § 202 (a)(1), 
as added by Pub. L. 89-272, § 101(8), 79 Stat. 992 and amended by 84 Stat. 1690 and 91 
Stat. 791, at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)). 
 180. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)). 
 181. Id. at 528. 
 182. Id.; see also O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 428. 
 183. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 529. 
 184. Id. at 532; see also O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 428. 
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Court has recognized the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases, in-
cluding carbon emissions.185  The EPA’s initial reluctance to regulate car-
bon emissions, however, suggests that it may be equally reluctant to impose 
a voluntary nationwide eco-labeling effort in the United States,186 particu-
larly without a direct congressional mandate. 
F. Eco-Labeling Experience: Current United States and 
International Frameworks 
In considering the implementation of a carbon eco-labeling program, a 
closer look at other labeling models provides guidance.  This section first 
examines the framework for “organic” labeled products in the United 
States, which has achieved national success with a non-binding voluntary 
labeling program that issued uniform definitions.  Second, Germany’s Blue 
Angel program is a prime example of how an eco-labeling program can in-
tegrate the public and private sector in addition to building credibility 
among consumers.  Finally, the recent creation of the United Kingdom 
Carbon Trust shows a public-private hybrid model specifically pertaining 
to carbon labeling that is becoming increasingly successful over time. 
1. The Organic Foods Product Act: Organic Products Labeling 
In the early 1990s, organic farming became a practice that has main-
tained both its social popularity and continually increasing sales.187  In 
1990, sales of organic products in the United States were one billion dol-
lars.188  Between 1992 and 1997, organic cropland more than doubled.189  
Sales increased twenty percent annually from 1990 to 2000,190 and in 2008, 
organic sales in the United States reached nearly twenty-three billion dol-
 
 185. O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 429; see also John C. Dernbach & Seema Kakade, Cli-
mate Change Law: An Introduction, 29 ENERGY L.J. 1, 25 (2008). 
 186. O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 427. 
 187. CATHERINE R. GREENE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., U.S. ORGANIC FARMING EMERGES IN 
THE 1990S, ADOPTION OF CERTIFIED SYSTEMS 1 (2001), available at http://www. 
ers.usda.gov/Publications/AIB770/ (stating that organic farming systems prohibit the use of 
synthetic chemicals in crop production and hormones in livestock). 
 188. ORGANIC TRADE ASS’N, 2007 OTA MANUFACTURER SURVEY, INDUSTRY STATISTICS 
AND PROJECTED GROWTH (2007), available at http://www.ota.com/organic/mt/business.html 
[hereinafter 2007 OTA MANUFACTURER SURVEY]. 
 189. Lauren Zeichner, Product v. Process: Two Labeling Regimes for Genetically Engi-
neered Foods and How They Relate to Consumer Preference, 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y J. 467, 471 (2004); see also GREENE, supra note 187, at 7 tbl.4. 
 190. See GREENE, supra note 187, at 2-3; Zeichner, supra note 189;. 
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lars.191  Organic product sales are still anticipated to continue rising steadi-
ly, despite their premium prices in an economic recession.192 
Similar to consumer incentives with environmental labels, the average 
consumer’s “willingness to pay a premium for products bearing the ‘organ-
ic’ label is based, in significant part, on the perception that he/she will re-
ceive a product with special attributes . . . . These attributes . . . create a 
brand image and justify the increased cost.”193  A recent 2009 study on 
United States families’ organic attitudes and beliefs substantiated this 
claim.194  The study found that seventy-three percent of families buy organ-
ic products at least occasionally, primarily because they believe organic 
products possess specialized and increased benefits.195 
Prior to 1990, there were no regulations governing organic standards or 
product labeling; instead, private companies created their own standards 
and certifications.196  However, the proliferation of organic products caused 
confusion among consumers, who could not verify the authenticity of or-
ganic claims.197  As a result, conflicting and misleading claims threatened 
to undermine consumer confidence in organic products.198  In turn, con-
sumers and retailers became reluctant to purchase organic products.199  
Consumers were unable to find organic food in major supermarkets be-
cause of “large food distributors’ skepticism regarding organic claims and 
their inability to work directly with growers on certification.”200 
In response to the misleading claims, conflicting standards, and consum-
er confusion, Congress enacted the Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA) 
of 1990.201 The OFPA has three main goals: (1) establish national standards 
governing the marketing of certain agricultural products as organically pro-
duced; (2) assure consumers that organically produced products met a con-
 
 191. See ORGANIC TRADE ASS’N, 2009 ORGANIC INDUSTRY SURVEY 1 (May 2009), avail-
able at http://www.organicnewsroom.com/2009/05/organic_trade_association_rele_1.html. 
 192. See 2007 OTA MANUFACTURER SURVEY, supra note 188, at 2. 
 193. A. Bryan Endres, An Awkward Adolescence in the Organics Industry: Coming to 
Terms With Big Organics and Other Legal Challenges for the Industry’s Next Ten Years, 12 
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 17, 32 (2007). 
 194. See ORGANIC TRADE ASS’N, 2009 U.S. FAMILIES’ ORGANIC ATTITUDES & BELIEFS 
STUDY 2 (2009). 
 195. See id. 
 196. See Zeichner, supra note 189. 
 197. See Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized Certi-
fication of Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 851, 872 (2009). 
 198. See id.; see also Tushnet, supra note 95, at 241. 
 199. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197. 
 200. Endres, supra note 193, at 20; see also S. Rep. No. 101-357, at 267 (1990), re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4944. 
 201. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6515 (2004); see also Zeichner, supra note 189, at 472. 
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sistent standard; and (3) facilitate interstate commerce.202  Accordingly, the 
OFPA provides “national standards for organic production so that farmers 
know the rules, so that consumers are sure to get what they pay for, and so 
national and international trade in organic foods may prosper.”203  The fo-
cus of the OFPA is not to promote the healthiness or nutritional quality of 
organic products;204 rather, it is a marketing-oriented statute designed to 
reduce consumer confusion.205 
The OFPA delegated responsibility to the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) to implement the statute by establishing uniform stan-
dards for organic products as well as a certification program.206  The Act 
created the National Organic Program (NOP) within the USDA to develop 
the details of the organic regulations.207  The NOP created standards with 
the input of the National Organics Standards Board, which was composed 
of farmers, handlers, retailers, consumers, environmentalists, and scientists 
appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture.208  The regulations also created 
USDA-accredited agents—largely private entities who grant certification if 
a product complies with established organic standards.209  The organic pro-
ducers select their own accrediting agents to obtain organic certification.210 
2. International Success: Germany’s Blue Angel Program 
Germany, “touted as the ‘pioneer’ of eco labels,”211 instituted the first 
government-sponsored certification in 1977 called the “Blue Angel Pro-
gram.”212  The program relies on voluntary commitments from manufactur-
 
 202. 7 U.S.C. § 6501; see also Zeichner, supra note 189, at 472. 
 203. Endres, supra note 193, at 20 (citing S. REP. No. 101-357, at 267 (1990)); see also 
Tushnet, supra note 95, at 241 (citing Labels, Labeling, and Market Information, 7 C.F.R. § 
205.300 (2007), which requires that organic products have at least ninety-five percent or-
ganic content and the remainder must be on an approved list of ingredients). 
 204. See Endres, supra note 193, at 20; see also Grading, Certification, and Verification, 
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do? 
template=TemplateA&navID=GradingCertificationandVerfication&leftNav=Grading 
CertificationandVerfication&page=GradingCertificationAndVerification (last modified May 
29, 2009). 
 205. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 874. 
 206. See 7 U.S.C. § 6503(a) (2004); see also Zeichner, supra note 189, at 473. 
 207. See 7 U.S.C. § 6504 (2004). 
 208. See Zeichner, supra note 189, at 473. 
 209. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6514-6515 (2004); Endres, supra note 193. 
 210. See 7 U.S.C. § 6515. 
 211. Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 194. 
 212. Id.; see also Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 365 (“Germany does not have a par-
ticular statute prohibiting green advertising, but does have a government-sponsored national 
eco-labeling program called the Blue Angel program.”). 
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ers rather than a mandatory labeling program.213  Germany’s regulation is 
now a model replicated by other similar regulatory systems around the 
world.214 
The Blue Angel Program develops product categories and awards eco-
labels to products that comply with the determined criteria.215  The process 
for creating an eco-label category requires a proposal to the Federal Envi-
ronmental Agency,216 which reports to the Environmental Label Jury, an 
agency charged with reviewing and choosing categories for the program.217  
The Environmental Label Jury is composed of representatives from union, 
consumer, industrial, and environmental organizations.218  The Environ-
mental Label Jury examines public and governmental proposals219 and de-
cides which proposed categories should be tested by the Federal Environ-
mental Institute.220  The Federal Environmental Agency then performs 
testing using a life cycle analysis to determine at what stage a product has 
the most significant environmental impact.221 The Federal Environmental 
Agency drafts criteria for an approved product group and forwards it to the 
German Institute for Quality Assurance and Labeling (“Institute”) for fur-
ther review.222  The Institute holds hearings where industry representatives, 
consumer and environmental organizations, scientists, and testing institutes 
ask questions and make comments on the proposed criteria.223  The Insti-
tute forwards its comments on the criteria to the Environmental Labeling 
Jury, which has the final authority to approve a new category for eco-
labels.224 
After a new category has been approved, manufacturers can submit their 
products to the Federal Environmental Agency to determine if they meet 
 
 213. See Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 365. 
 214. See id.; see also Cavanaugh, supra note 105, at 198-200. 
 215. See Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 365. 
 216. The Blue Angel, GREENLABELSPURCHASE (2006), http://www.greenlabelspurchase. 
net/oe-blue-angel.html; see also Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 365-66. 
 217. See Staffin, supra note 107, at 225. 
 218. See Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 194. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See Staffin, supra note 107, at 225. 
 221. The Blue Angel, GREENLABELSPURCHASE, supra note 216; see also Abidiwan-Lupo, 
supra note 131, at 366. 
 222. The Blue Angel, GREENLABELSPURCHASE, supra note 216; see also Abidiwan-Lupo, 
supra note 131, at 366. 
 223. See Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 366. 
 224. See Staffin, supra note 107, at 225.  Examples of final standards for a product cate-
gory include: (1) minimum levels of energy consumption; (2) utilization of recycled mate-
rials; (3) product biodegradability; (4) prohibition of certain hazardous substances; and (5) 
reduced noise levels. See Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 195. 
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the required criteria.225  “The manufacturer’s criteria are verified by eva-
luating ‘statements from the manufacturer, testing by independent facilities, 
and data and product information sheets.’”226  If the criteria are met, the 
Blue Angel Program enters into an agreement with the manufacturer which 
permits them to use the Blue Angel logo on that product’s packaging and 
direct product advertising for three years in exchange for a licensing fee. 227  
The agreement requires the manufacturer to pay an annual fee based on es-
timated annual sales of the products and a contribution to the advertising 
fund for the Blue Angel Program.228 
Since 1993, the Blue Angel eco-label has appeared on over 3500 prod-
ucts in approximately seventy-five product categories.229  The Blue Angel 
eco-label is used by approximately 895 licensees for approximately 11,500 
products.230  The label has a recognition rate of seventy-nine percent 
among consumers.231  Its success has shown that over time, consumer 
awareness of a brand, understanding environmental issues, and trust in a 
label’s credibility can be accomplished. 
3. UK Carbon Trust: A Carbon Eco-Labeling Model 
In 2001, the British government created the Carbon Trust, an indepen-
dent company, to work with private organizations to reduce their overall 
carbon emissions and develop low carbon technologies.232  Carbon Trust 
provides “specialist support to business and the public sector to help cut 
carbon emissions, save energy and commercialise low carbon technolo-
gies.”233 
Carbon Trust created the Carbon Trust Footprinting Company, which 
works with companies “to measure, reduce and communicate the lifecycle 
 
 225. See Staffin, supra note 107, at 225-26. 
 226. Abidwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 366 (quoting Environmental Labeling Issues, 
Policies, and Practices Worldwide, EPA Doc. No. 742-R-98-009 app. B-49, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY (1998), http://www.epa.gov/epp/pubs.wwlabel3.php). 
 227. See Staffin, supra note 107, at 225-26.  Staffin notes that while there is some varia-
tion in the administrative structure of voluntary eco-labeling programs, most follow the 
same process of selecting of categories, testing, setting criteria, and awarding seals of ap-
proval. Id. at 224. 
 228. See Abidwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 366. 
 229. The Blue Angel in Numbers, THE BLUE ANGEL, http://www.blauer-engel.de/en/ 
blauer_engel/balance/index.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2010); see also Staffin, supra note 
107, at 226. 
 230. The Blue Angel in Numbers, THE BLUE ANGEL, supra note 229. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 421. 
 233. About the Carbon Trust: What We Do, THE CARBON TRUST (2009), http://www. 
carbontrust.co.uk/about-carbon-trust/what-we-do/pages/default.aspx. 
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greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of their products and services.”234  It at-
tempts to address consumer needs by aiding individuals in making choices 
to lower their respective carbon footprints.235  In 2009, the Carbon Trust 
Footprinting Certification Company was established “to provide indepen-
dent and impartial certification services for product carbon footprints.”236  
The company applies a standard set of criteria to product categories mea-
suring the carbon footprint of products and services.237  To calculate a 
company’s carbon footprint, the company itself uses Carbon Trust’s “Foot-
print Expert,” a toolkit that allows organizations to calculate their footprints 
as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible.238  If a company’s carbon 
footprint is in compliance with the certification requirements of the “Foot-
print Expert” within that product category, the Carbon Trust Footprinting 
Certification Company will provide certification to the company and their 
products.239  A company’s products and services can then display the Car-
bon Reduction Label, which shows the product’s carbon footprint through-
out its lifecycle.240  A company that chooses to place the label on their 
product is signaling a commitment to consumers to reduce the carbon foot-
print of that product; if the company does not reduce their carbon footprint 
within two years, the label will be withdrawn. 241 
Since the introduction of the Carbon Reduction Label,242 “there are 
twenty companies with approximately seventy-five products” using the 
carbon labeling program.243  These include major companies, such as Boots 
(Europe’s leading pharmacy and beauty chain stores), PepsiCo, Tesco Su-
 
 234. About the Carbon Trust Footprinting Company, THE CARBON TRUST (2009), http:// 
www.carbon-label.com/business/about.htm. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. The Footprinting Process, THE CARBON TRUST (2009), http://www.carbon-
label.com/business/footprintingProcess.htm; see also O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 423-24.  
The measurement process requires: (1) building a process map, including setting bounda-
ries, understanding available data, and identifying sources; (2) collecting primary data from 
members of the supply chain and collating secondary data; (3) assessing materiality; and (4) 
building the carbon footprint. The Footprinting Process, supra. 
 238. The Footprinting Process, supra note 237. 
 239. Independent Certification, THE CARBON TRUST (2009), http://www.carbon-label. 
com/business/certification.htm. 
 240. See The Carbon Reduction Label Explained, THE CARBON TRUST (2009), http:// 
www.carbon-label.com/business/label.htm. 
 241. See O’Neill, supra note 162, at 422. 
 242. Carbon Trust Launches Carbon Reduction Label, THE CARBON TRUST, at 1 (Mar. 
16, 2007), http://www.carbon-label.com/news/16.03.07.pdf; see also O’Neill, supra note 
162, at 424 (“Carbon labels were unveiled on shelves in the UK in April 2007.”). 
 243. O’Neill, supra note 162, at 424. 
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permarkets, Coca-Cola, Marshalls, and Kimberly Clark.244  While a majori-
ty of consumers still do not understand the meaning of carbon footprints, 
consumers still have “welcomed having environmental information on 
products.”245  A June 2009 Carbon Trust survey of one thousand consumers 
across the UK found that almost two-thirds of consumers were more likely 
to buy a product if they knew action was being taken to reduce its carbon 
footprint.246 
G. The New Generation of Environmental Claims: Carbon 
Neutrality and Offsets 
1. Current Review of the Green Guides 
In 2007, the FTC acknowledged that new advertising terminology was 
becoming commonplace and began reevaluating its guidelines with a series 
of public workshops.247  “The FTC specifically asked whether the Green 
Guides should be modified to include guidance regarding . . . claims invok-
ing the phrases ‘renewable energy’ and ‘carbon offset.’”248  At an April 
2008 workshop, FTC Chairman William Kovacic stated that the FTC’s 
goal was to ensure that consumers maintain confidence in the truthfulness 
of advertising claims in an age of changing “social norms” and industry 
development.249  John Kalkowski noted that he is hearing more and more 
terms that were “not even in our lexicon a few years ago.”250  At a January 
2008 workshop, the FTC specifically discussed the increasing focus of ad-
 
 244. See Press Release, The Carbon Trust, High Street Failing on Footprinting, Say Con-
sumers (June 2009), http://www.carbon-label.com/news/16.06.09.pdf; see also O’ Neill, su-
pra note 162, at 424 (explaining that the first product to display the Carbon Reduction Label 
was Walker’s Cheese and Onion Crisps). 
 245. James Murray, Tesco Defends Carbon Label Scheme, BUSINESSGREEN (May 21, 
2008), http://www.businessgreen.com/business-green/news/2217167/tesco-defends-carbon-
label. 
 246. See Press Release, The Carbon Trust, supra note 244. 
 247. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 869-70. 
 248. Gibson, supra note 35, at 430; see also Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 870 
(stating that the FTC is now considering whether to amend the Green Guides to include car-
bon offsets). 
 249. William Kovacic, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Fed. 
Trade Comm’n’s Workshop on Green Packaging Claims 17 (Apr. 30, 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/packaging/transcript.pdf. 
 250. John Kalkowski, Editor, Packaging Digest Mag., Remarks at the Fed. Trade 
Comm’n’s Workshop on Green Packaging Claims 23 (Apr. 30, 2008), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/packaging/transcript.pdf. 
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vertisement on a product’s carbon footprint,251 claims of carbon neutrali-
ty,252 and carbon offset reduction.253 
Although the revised Green Guides were supposed to be released in 
April 2009, the FTC still has not released any revisions or updates.254  The 
FTC released a notice that it is considering “conducting its own study re-
lated to consumer perception of environmental marketing claims”255 to 
“compare participant responses regarding the meaning of different envi-
ronmental marketing claims.”256  At the June 2009 House of Energy and 
Commerce subcommittee on Trade and Consumer Protection, Kohm ex-
plained that though the workshops resulted in useful information and re-
sponse, the FTC obtained little information about how consumers under-
stand certain claims.257  He stated that the FTC “plans to conduct its own 
research,” but had no anticipated release date for the revisions.258 
2. The New Terminology: Carbon Neutrality and Carbon Offsets 
Carbon has become increasingly prominent both in product labeling and 
advertisements for consumers to purchase goods that offset individuals’ 
carbon footprints.259  In the United States, sixty percent of an individual’s 
carbon footprint is attributable to one’s goods and services purchases; thus, 
the “impetus for carbon labels is that by providing consumers with infor-
mation about the carbon content of a product, they will be able to make in-
formed decisions about the goods they purchase and ultimately choose 
products with a smaller carbon footprint.”260  Despite concerns of consum-
 
 251. See infra notes 254-79 and accompanying text. 
 252. See infra notes 254-79 and accompanying text. 
 253. See infra notes 254-79 and accompanying text. 
 254. See generally It’s Too Easy Being Green: Defining Fair Green Marketing Practices: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of James Kohm, Dir. En-
forcement Div., Fed. Trade Comm’n) [hereinafter It’s Too Easy Being Green]. 
 255. Agency Information Collection Activities, 74 Fed. Reg. 90,396 (Fed. Trade 
Comm’n May 11, 2009). 
 256. Id. 
 257. See It’s Too Easy Being Green, supra note 254. 
 258. Id. at 4-5. 
 259. See Woods, supra note 15, at 83; see also Majoras, supra note 3, at 13 (“The term 
‘carbon neutral’ has received a lot of attention.”); O’Neill, supra note 162, at 422; Savasta-
Kennedy, supra note 197, at 851-52 (“Anyone who has booked online an airline flight, a 
hotel room, or rented a car in the last few years has had the opportunity to ‘offset’ the 
greenhouse gas (GHG) pollution . . . by investing in a carbon offset.”); Federal Trade 
Commission Webcast of Workshop Examining Market for Carbon Offsets, ENVTL. EVALUA-
TION ORG. (Jan. 14, 2008), http://www.envirovaluation.org/index.php/2008/01/14/ [hereinaf-
ter Webcast]. 
 260. O’Neill, supra note 162, at 396. 
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er confusion, “[t]he sale of carbon offsets . . . if marketed truthfully, can 
provide interested consumers the opportunity to participate in this market . . 
. that may reduce emissions.”261 
Many products bear a “carbon-neutral” label, which is accomplished by 
offsetting the carbon emissions.262  A carbon offset displaces or sequesters 
greenhouse gas emissions in one location to compensate for the emissions 
that occur at another source location.263  The cost of a carbon offset pro-
gram should be directed to “alternative energy development and sustaina-
bility initiatives.”264  Yet, most consumers lack real awareness of the actual 
definition of a carbon offset.265  For example, a survey conducted by the 
Shelton Group asked consumers to place a check next to any true statement 
about carbon dioxide and forty-nine percent incorrectly answered that car-
bon dioxide depletes the ozone layer.266  Furthermore, it is extremely diffi-
cult for consumers to verify purchases of carbon offsets because the offset-
ting generally occurs away from the consumers.267  According to the 
former FTC Chairman Deborah Majoras, “with this much uncertainty, 
there’s a heightened potential for deception.”268 
The number of products labeled carbon neutral continues to expand ra-
pidly.  For example, the TESCO supermarket launched a program in April 
2008 with carbon neutral labels on products such as potatoes, aiming to 
“footprint” five hundred products.269  In 2010, TESCO made headlines by 
opening its first “zero carbon store as part of its bid to be a carbon neutral 
 
 261. Majoras, supra note 3, at 13-14. 
 262. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 852 (noting that there are carbon neutral 
football games, baby showers, computer companies and a variety of other products). 
 263. See Comments to the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Carbon Offset Work-
shop Comment Project No. P074207, OFFSET QUALITY INITIATIVE, Jan. 25, 2008, at 3; see 
also Woods, supra note 15, at 85 (“Carbon offsets do just what their name suggests: They 
permit individuals or businesses to emit greenhouse gases at their current rates, but mitigate 
that pollution by paying to create or improve upon clean energy technology in other loca-
tions.”). 
 264. Woods, supra note 15, at 85. 
 265. Even more educated consumers may believe a manufacturer is producing less car-
bon emissions when there actually may be no on-site mitigation of the emissions; instead, 
off-site reduction provides a less costly way to reduce carbon emissions. See id. at 85-86. 
 266. Green Consumers Worried About the Economy, SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (Aug. 
27, 2009), http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/18776. 
 267. See Majoras, supra note 3, at 14; Woods, supra note 15, at 85. 
 268. Majoras, supra note 3, at 15. 
 269. Alistair Driver, Tesco’s New Carbon Footprint Label, FARMERS GUARDIAN, Aug. 
28, 2009, at 5. 
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company by 2050.”270  Other available carbon neutral products include 
carbon neutral clothing,271 a carbon neutral cell phone,272 carbon neutral 
printing equipment,273 carbon neutral quinoa,274 carbon neutral sugar,275 
and even carbon negative bottled water.276 
The carbon offsets themselves have similarly become prominent prod-
ucts in environmental advertising.  Currently, major corporations such as 
Dell, Continental Airlines, General Electric, and Bank of America advertise 
to consumers that they can purchase carbon offsets for a variety of products 
to decrease their carbon footprints.277  Dell, for example, allows consumers 
to purchase offsets on computer purchases; Bank of America allows credit 
card reward points to be used towards a carbon offset purchase.278 
More recently, voluntary offset markets have advertised carbon offsets 
for direct sale to individual consumers.279  Since 2002, the global market 
for voluntary offsets has increased over one hundred fifty percent.280  In 
 
 270. Julia Finch, Tesco Opens Its First Zero Carbon Store, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Feb. 2, 
2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/feb/02/tesco-carbon-neutral-green-
building. 
 271. See Carbon Neutral Clothing Certification Standards, CARBON NEUTRAL CLOTHING, 
http://www.carbonneutralclothing.com (last visited Aug. 3, 2010). 
 272. See Press Release, Motorola, Motorola Unveils First Mobile Phone Made Using Re-
cycled Water Bottle Plastics (Jan. 6, 2009), available at http://mediacenter.motorola.com/ 
Content/Detail.aspx?ReleaseID=10464&NewsAreaID=2.  The phone, called the “MOTO 
W233 Renew,” is considered “carbon-neutral” by Motorola because it “offsets the carbon 
dioxide required to manufacture, distribute and operate the phone through investments in 
renewable energy sources and reforestation.” Id. 
 273. See New Zealand’s First Carbon Neutral Office Company, RICOH, Aug. 3, 2009, at 
1, available at http://www.ricoh.co.nz/about/environment/rnz_c0.pdf; About Ricoh, “Plant 
a Tree in Africa Program,” RICOH, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.ricoh.com/ 
environment/report/pdf2007/11_12.pdf. 




 275. See Introducing Domino Sugar Carbon Free, DOMINO SUGAR (2009), http://www. 
dominosugar.com/carbonfree/. 
 276. See Claudia H. Deutsch, Fiji Water Vows to Go Carbon Negative, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
7, 2007, at Business 3. 
 277. See Webcast, supra note 259. 
 278. See id. 
 279. What You Can Do: Go Carbon Neutral, DAVID SUZUKI FOUNDATION, http://www. 
davidsuzuki.org/what-you-can-do/reduce-your-carbon-footprint/go-carbon-neutral/ (last vi-
sited Sept. 9, 2010) [hereinafter DAVID SUZUKI FOUNDATION] (detailing a list of companies 
that provide carbon offsets for air travel, vehicles, home electricity, gas, and general ven-
dors). 
 280. See Jackie Crosby & Karen Youso, Can We Buy Our Way to a Greener World?, 
STAR TRIBUNE, Apr. 2, 2007, at 1A, available at http://www.mepartnership.org/mep_ 
pressroom.asp?new_id=2257. 
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2007 alone, corporations and individual consumers in the United States 
spent more than $54 million dollars on carbon offsets to balance emissions 
created by their energy-producing activities.281  “Trade in carbon offset 
credits is estimated to be more than $100 million a year” and is expected to 
continue expanding.282  “That number represents a threefold increase in 
value from 2006.”283  Consumers are experiencing difficulty interpreting 
express or implied claims about the environmental benefits of offsets as 
well as how to verify these purchases.284  Because these offsets are pur-
chased in a voluntary market without any federal regulation, consumers 
should “[p]roceed with caution,” because without “more government over-
sight, it’s a case of buyer beware for consumers.”285 
3. The Carbon Offset Market in the United States 
Although there is no overarching federal regulatory program, there are 
two types of carbon markets in the United States: the Chicago Climate Ex-
change and the voluntary carbon market.286  The Chicago Climate Ex-
change is a cap-and-trade system where members voluntarily commit to re-
ducing their emissions and can trade emissions or purchase offsets to 
achieve their emissions goals.287  In contrast, the voluntary carbon market 
is individuals and a wide range of companies purchasing carbon offsets 
without a formal exchange program.288  All retail transactions made by in-
 
 281. See Lynn L. Bergeson, Green Marketing Claims: FTC Enters the Fray, BNP MEDIA, 
Nov. 1, 2008, at 15. 
 282. Tracy Heinzmand & Hugh Latimer, Understanding the Carbon Footprint, METRO-
POLITAN CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.wileyrein.com/resources/ 
documents/pu698.pdf. 
 283. Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 852; see also Kate Hamilton, Carbon Project 
Manager, Ecosystem Marketplace, Remarks at the Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Workshop on Car-
bon Offsets and Renewable Energy Certificates 34 (Jan. 8, 2008), available at http://www. 
ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/carbonoffsets/transcript/session1.pdf (“Ecosystem Marketplace de-
cided to start tracking this [carbon offset] market . . . .  [T]he market grew rapidly between 
2005 and 2006.”). 
 284. See K. Russell LaMotte, Re: Carbon Offset Workshop, CARBON OFFSET PROVIDERS 
COAL., Jan. 25, 2008, at 2. 
 285. Crosby & Youso, supra note 280. 
 286. See Hamilton, supra note 283, at 33; see also Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 
861-62.  For further discussion on voluntary markets, see ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE & 
NEW CARBON FINANCE, FORGING A FRONTIER: STATE OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS 
2008, at 17-19 (2008). 
 287. See Hamilton, supra note 283, at 33. 
 288. See id.; Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 862 (discussing that participants in the 
voluntary carbon market include individuals and organizations interested in offsetting their 
carbon emissions and that the carbon market consists of a wide range of transactions). 
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dividuals in the United States take place in the voluntary market.289 Among 
carbon offset retailers, the most common method is using their own stan-
dard for determining carbon offsets, followed by use of the “Voluntary 
Carbon Standard.”290 
Manufacturers and consumers have described the voluntary market for 
offsetting emissions as a means by which individuals can address climate 
change.291  Industry representatives assert that it is “an easy to way to take 
responsibility for the greenhouse gas emissions we create . . . .”292  A report 
by Standard Life Investments on carbon management and neutrality, how-
ever, warns that carbon offset programs “have the capacity to disguise the 
failure to achieve actual reductions in overall greenhouse gas emissions.”293  
For example, Dell announced it had achieved carbon neutrality, but failed 
to include any specific information about its oil use, use of fuel for product 
shipping, or electricity needed to operate its product.294  Yet, “[c]onsumers 
looking to buy a computer might mistakenly conclude that Dell’s an-
nounced carbon neutrality means that buying a Dell computer will not con-
tribute to climate change.”295 
Currently, there are two main standards for calculating greenhouse gas 
emissions: the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS)296 and the PAS 2050.297  
The PAS 2050 specifies requirements for assessing the life cycle green-
house gas emissions of products from organizations that supply goods and 
services and calculate their carbon footprint.298  Similarly, the VCS sets 
standards for greenhouse gas emissions reductions using “verifiers” to con-
duct independent tests to determine emissions using a specified methodolo-
gy.299 
 
 289. See LaMotte, supra note 284. 
 290. Hamilton, supra note 283, at 40. 
 291. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 853. 
 292. DAVID SUZUKI FOUNDATION, supra note 279. 
 293. The Carbon Neutral Myth, CARBON TRADE WATCH, Feb. 2007, at 6, available at 
http://www.carbontradewatch.org/pubs/carbon_neutral_myth.pdf (citing CARBON MANAGE-
MENT & CARBON NEUTRALITY, STANDARD LIFE INVESTMENTS, July 2006, available at 
http://uk.standardlifeinvestments.com/content/pdf/sli/CO-CarbonNeutralityReport.pdf). 
 294. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 854-55. 
 295. Id. at 855. 
 296. See The Voluntary Carbon Standard, VOLUNTARY CARBON STANDARD (2008), 
http://v-c-s.org/. 
 297. See PAS 2050: Assessing the Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Goods and 
Services, BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION (2010), http://www.bsigroup.com/en/Standards-
and-Publications/How-we-can-help-you/Professional-Standards-Service/PAS-2050/. 
 298. PAS 2050, BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION (2009), http://shop.bsigroup.com/en/ 
Browse-by-Sector/Energy--Utilities/PAS-2050/. 
 299. Frequently Asked Questions, VOLUNTARY CARBON STANDARD (2008), http://v-c-s. 
org/faq.html#question11. 
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Like general environmental third-party certification programs, there are 
private certification companies that provide certification and eco-labels 
specifically to carbon offset providers.300  However, a product bearing a 
green label does not necessarily inform a consumer what criteria the third-
party company uses to determine certification.  For example, a bottle may 
displaying an environmental seal for renewable energy because its product 
label was printed in a renewable-energy facility, not necessarily because 
that the bottle and its contents were separately manufactured using renewa-
ble energy.301  Since consumers are already less knowledgeable about the 
meaning of carbon offsets,302 the lack of information can further increase 
consumer confusion. 
II.  PROPOSALS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING REGULATIONS 
Part II explores potential proposals for improving environmental adver-
tising regulations and who should take charge in their implementation.  
First, Part II will discuss the various criticisms of the Green Guides that 
have launched a movement for reform, both inside the FTC and from ex-
ternal sources.  Next, it will examine the benefits and disadvantages of a 
pure, privately operated certification system, compared to those of a gov-
ernment model in which a federal agency would be primarily responsible 
for developing standards and providing certification.  Finally, this section 
explores the possibility of a public-private hybrid model in which the gov-
ernment and private sector jointly collaborate to devise standards, create an 
eco-labeling program, and enforce advertising regulations. 
A. Criticisms of the Green Guides 
Since the adoption of the Green Guides in 1992, they have been subject 
to criticism and proposals for reform.303  Although modified in 1996, the 
revisions failed to address the major critiques of the Guides.304  The five 
most common criticism of the guides are: (1) the guidelines are voluntary 
and thus do not have the force of law; (2) the guidelines provide extremely 
vague definitions and lack the specificity needed for scientific terminology; 
 
 300. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 866. 
 301. Green Packaging Workshop Comment Project No. P084200, CTR. FOR RES. SOLU-
TIONS, Apr. 11, 2008, at 3. 
 302. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
 303. See Woods, supra note 15, at 81. 
 304. See Robert B. White, Preemption in Green Marketing: The Case for Uniform Fed-
eral Marketing Definitions, 85 IND. L.J. 325, 335-36 (2010); see also Lauren C. Avallone, 
Green Marketing: The Urgent Need for Federal Regulation, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 
685, 686 (2006). 
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(3) because the guidelines are voluntary, they do not preempt state regula-
tions which prevents a uniform standard; (4) the guidelines have failed to 
provide effective monitoring and enforcement; and (5) the terminology in 
outdated and does not reflect current environmental marketing trends.305 
1. Non-Binding Regulations 
Although the FTC has the authority to promulgate binding guidelines 
under Section 5 of the FTCA, the Green Guides only put forth voluntary 
principles for “guidance of the public.”306  Proponents have argued that the 
Green Guides should be given the force of law to increase their effective-
ness.307  Because the guidelines are voluntary, the FTC has failed to inves-
tigate many dubious environmental advertisements.308  For voluntary 
guidelines, the FTC is required to prove in each case that the practice in 
question would violate the standard provisions of the FTCA.309  As a result, 
the FTC must expend significant resources in each enforcement action and 
has thus prosecuted only the most visible and egregious violators.310  If the 
guidelines were binding, any misleading advertisement would automatical-
ly constitute a violation.311  Binding regulations could potentially maximize 
industry compliance by providing greater information to manufacturers and 
holding them accountable to consistent standards.312  Companies would be 
cognizant that any misleading or deceptive advertisement would result in 
actual consequences.313  Furthermore, it would reduce transaction costs, 
which would permit more frequent enforcement and, in turn, broader deter-
rence of misleading advertising.314  Since misleading statements can gener-
ate substantial confusion among consumers thereby depriving them of op-
portunities to reward manufacturers marketing environmentally superior 
products, without binding regulations, universal compliance and self-
regulation is unlikely.315 
 
 305. See Avallone, supra note 304, at 686. 
 306. 16 C.F.R. § 260.1 (1996). 
 307. See Avallone, supra note 304, at 690-91; Gibson, supra note 35, at 434. 
 308. Heather Green, How Green Is That Gizmo?, BUS. WK., Dec. 20, 2007, at 36. 
 309. Grodsky, supra note 83, at 159; Appendix 1—Laws Enforced by the FTC, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 61. 
 310. See Grodsky, supra note 83, at 159; Green, supra note 308. 
 311. See Gibson, supra note 35, at 434. 
 312. See id. (“Such automatic liability would provide a strong incentive to comply with 
the Green Guides.”). 
 313. See Grodsky, supra note 83, at 169; see also Gibson, supra note 35, at 434. 
 314. See Gibson, supra note 35, at 434. 
 315. See id. 
FLIEGELMAN_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:52 PM 
1038 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
2. Vagueness in the Guidelines 
The standards and terminology defined in the Green Guides are vague 
primarily because they are not based on scientific technology,316 but rather 
on how the FTC believes the advertisement will affect a consumer’s deci-
sion making.317  As a result, manufacturers have often complained that they 
fail to provide “clear rules on what they may or may not claim about their 
products.  Instead, manufacturers are left to interpret the definitions and ex-
amples in assessing whether their claims are valid.”318 
Since the current guidelines do not require specificity in advertising, 
manufacturers frequently use short slogans to characterize a product’s envi-
ronmental characteristics.319  Such brevity is often “achieved at the expense 
of clarity.”320  Vague claims, like “green” or “environmentally friendly” 
have become the common method of describing a product with some bene-
ficial environmental aspect, but when used in product labeling, the terms 
often do not reflect the harmful effects or tradeoff a product may have or 
any scientific analysis.321  Proponents of specific standards thus argue that 
any future environmental regulations should provide definitions that are as 
specific as possible, “directing advertisers to make precise claims about the 
ingredients or environmental effects of their products [because] [v]ague 
standards are inadequate for creating meaningful distinctions among prod-
uct labels.”322 
The lack of specificity particularly impacts carbon product labeling.  
Currently, there is no industry consensus for baseline minimum standards 
to verify carbon offsets.323  There are ten certification standards in the 
United States that are specifically used for carbon certification.324  This has 
raised concerns of consumer confusion and the potential for fraud325  be-
cause each label has different standards or definitions.326  A consumer has 
 
 316. See Woods, supra note 15, at 78. 
 317. See id. 
 318. Avallone, supra note 304, at 692. 
 319. See Luehr, supra note 2, at 316. 
 320. Id. 
 321. See id. at 320-21; see also supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
 322. Grodsky, supra note 83, at 166; see also Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 377; 
Downs, supra note 2, at 168. 
 323. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 869. 
 324. See id. at 876; Eric Carlson, Executive Director, Carbonfund.org, Remarks at Feder-
al Trade Comm’n’s Workshop on Carbon Offsets and Renewable Energy Certificates 222 
(Jan. 8, 2008) (“We don’t have a lack of standards in the industry.  We have a huge number 
of standards . . . .”). 
 325. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 869. 
 326. See id. 
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no say in which protocol is used and is likely unaware of the distinctions 
between certified protocols.327  Narrowing the field from ten diverse certi-
fications to one uniform standard would create a way to verify a set group 
of offset attributes.328 
The Carbon Offset Providers Coalition, comprised of leading companies 
in the carbon offset market,329 has recognized that the terminology’s com-
plexity is challenging the decision-making ability of consumers.330  The 
Coalition states that consumers have a “need to know and understand the 
‘content’ of what they are buying,” which is best accomplished by requir-
ing that the relevant information be available.331  While products claiming 
carbon-neutrality state that information may not be available at the point of 
sale, the Coalition suggests making the information available to consumers 
through a publicly-accessible registrar.332  This could include specific com-
ponents of a product as well as easily accessible definitions of the terms 
used in a product claim.  Thus, the Coalition proposes that the FTC identify 
the information required by a consumer and have it compiled so consumers 
can more easily substantiate product claims.333  Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company, a private combination of natural gas and electric utilities in the 
United States, also submitted a comment to the FTC suggesting that the 
FTC establish “consistent parameters for voluntary carbon offset programs 
. . . .”334  Similarly, Consumers Union suggests that carbon offset and re-
newable energy terms made in advertising or product claims “require scope 
and specific definition provided by the FTC.”335 Consumers Union argues 
that not only should the terminology have specific definitions, but also that 
companies should be required to provide disclosures on specific actions, 
such as whether the offsets are direct or indirect by specifying the type of 
offset action taken to reduce marketplace deception.336 
 
 327. See id. 
 328. See id. at 876. 
 329. See LaMotte, supra note 284, at Exhibit 1. 
 330. See id. at 4. 
 331. Id. 
 332. See id. 
 333. See id. at 4-5. 
 334. Carbon Offset Workshop—Comment, Project No. P074207, PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., 
Jan. 8, 2008, at 1. 
 335. Letter from Urvashi Rangan, Senior Scientist & Policy Analyst, Consumers Union, 
to Hampton Newsome, Fed. Trade Comm’n 1 (Jan. 25, 2008), available at http://www.ftc. 
gov/os/comments/carbonworkshop/533254-00026.pdf. 
 336. See id. at 1-2. 
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3. Federal Preemption of State Standards 
Because the guidelines are non-binding, they do not preempt states’ in-
dividual regulations.337  The result has been a lack of national uniformity in 
environmental regulations.338 Though several states have used the Guides 
as a model when enacting regulation, other states have created stricter stan-
dards and more precise definitions to combat the perceived leniency of the 
Green Guides.339  The standards and definitions, however, vary vastly 
among the states.  For example, California, New York, and Rhode Island 
each define “recycled” differently.340 
The current lack of uniformity, as a consequence of the state-by-state en-
forcement approach, has created difficulties both for lawmakers and manu-
facturers.341  Federal lawmakers and the FTC have greater difficulty hold-
ing manufacturers accountable for violations.342  The FTC cannot only 
consider whether a manufacturer has violated the Green Guides, but must 
also consider whether a manufacturer has violated the more specific re-
quirements implemented by that state.343 
Furthermore, manufacturers incur greater costs from this patchwork of 
standards, which can prevent advertiser compliance.344  These include di-
rect costs like printing new labels for each state and indirect costs such as 
maintaining two or more product inventories and imposing separate distri-
bution and record-keeping requirements for each state.345  Manufacturers 
must also monitor up to fifty independent standards, which requires sub-
stantial time and money to ensure awareness of and compliance with each 
state’s current laws.346  This can particularly burden smaller companies 
who may lack the resources to monitor the variations.347  Companies may 
be unable to provide environmental information about their products with-
out fearing legal repercussions based on a state’s individual practice.348 
 
 337. See Woods, supra note 15, at 82. 
 338. See id. 
 339. See Avallone, supra note 304, at 689-90. 
 340. See Grodsky, supra note 83, at 164. 
 341. See Avallone, supra note 304, at 686. 
 342. See id. 
 343. See id. 
 344. See Grodsky, supra note 83, at 164. 
 345. See David F. Welsh, Environmental Marketing and Federal Preemption of State 
Law: Eliminating the “Gray” Behind the “Green,” 81 CALIF. L. REV. 991, 1003 (1993). 
 346. See id. (“Without uniform standards, the costs involved in marketing products to 
different states can make it virtually impossible for honest manufacturers to provide envi-
ronmental information.”). 
 347. See id. at 1003-04. 
 348. See id. at 1004. 
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Federal preemption of state regulations has been suggested to create na-
tional uniformity and remedy the issues created by the state-by-state ap-
proach.349  Proponents believe that “federal preemption is ultimately neces-
sary to ensure that the law . . . is both clear and consistent.”350  For new 
technology, where the market is largely unregulated, the Offset Quality In-
itiative, a collaborative group of environmental non-profit organizations, 
actually “recommends the establishment of a centralized oversight and en-
forcement agency that would be tasked with ensuring the accuracy.”351 
Opponents of preemption argue that preempting state standards to create 
uniformity would inappropriately mix environmental and advertising poli-
cy.352  They argue that the federal regulations fail to impose sufficiently 
strict regulations and federal preemption would be a “foolhardy” example 
of “paternal[ism].”353  States “have an incentive to go beyond any mini-
mum federal standards because they want to be recognized as leaders in 
high profile fields like environmental regulation.” 354  For example, “when 
FTC Commissioner Mary Azcuenaga asked a New York state official 
whether New York would change its ‘recyclable’ standard to meet FTC 
guidelines . . . [t]he officer stated that New York would certainly continue 
to ‘be creative’ with regulatory approaches if the federal government estab-
lished merely a regulatory floor.”355 
Specifically for carbon offsets, opponents advise against creating a uni-
form standard because there are substantial differences among profession-
als for carbon calculations, such as the underlying basis for measurement 
and verification.356  Others argue, however, that the proliferation of stan-
dards has caused consumer confusion and a uniform certification standard 
would address the issue of consumer protection.357  To compromise in the 
debate between federal and state powers, one suggestion has been to create 
a federal program that supplants state definitions, but allows states to 
 
 349. See id. at 1015. 
 350. Id. at 994-95; see also Avallone, supra note 304, at 697. 
 351. Alexia Kelly, Comments to the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Carbon Off-
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promulgate certain laws that go beyond the federally created minimum 
standards.358 
4. Lack of Enforcement of the Green Guides 
Since 2000, the FTC has brought only three enforcement actions for vi-
olation of the Green Guides.359  Each of these actions was announced the 
same day FTC Chairman James Kohm appeared before the House of Rep-
resentatives in a subcommittee hearing on the problems in environmental 
advertising.360  Since then, the only FTC action taken against greenwashing 
has been a warning letter to seventy-eight businesses requiring them to alter 
advertising and label practices for bamboo-based clothing, traditionally 
considered eco-friendly, but in fact made from chemically processed 
rayon.361  Even when companies are found to have violated the Green 
Guides, they are subject to limited sanctions, which generally amount to an 
agreement to discontinue the warning and a broad cease-and-desist order 
prohibiting future misleading claims.362 
The lack of enforcement has been attributed to the FTC’s case-by case 
enforcement approach.363  “Since the 1970s, the FTC has prosecuted mis-
leading environmental advertising on a case-by-case basis.”364  Prior to the 
adoption of the Green Guides, the NAAG, the EPA, and the National Ad-
vertising Division (“NAD”) all criticized the ineffectiveness of the FTC’s 
enforcement.365  The NAAG described it as “too ponderous to allow swift 
reaction to the emergence of new marketing strategies.”366  A group of 
manufacturers also criticized the approach, “explaining that until the 
Commission issues national green marketing guidelines, the states will en-
 
 358. See Welsh, supra note 345, at 1020-21. 
 359. News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Actions Against Kmart, Ten-
der and Dyna-E Alleging Deceptive ‘Biodegradable’ Claims (June 9, 2009), available at 
www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/06/kmart.shtm. 
 360. See id. 
 361. See FTC Warns Marketers Not to ‘Bamboozle’ Consumers with Misleading Biode-
gradable or Green Claims, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Mar. 1, 2010, available at http://www. 
thefreelibrary.com/_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=220021209. 
 362. See Woods, supra note 15, at 81-82. 
 363. See Israel, supra note 58, at 318; Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 870 (“[G]iven 
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force the law in an inconsistent manner and manufacturers will not be cer-
tain that their green claims comply with the law.”367 
Further contributing to the FTC’s lack of enforcement is the FTC’s un-
willingness to pursue any action that might be seen as creating environmen-
tal policy.368  The FTC has been hesitant to take an active role, many scho-
lars have been left “wondering ‘why shouldn’t environmental marketing 
claims be regulated like all others . . . .’”369  At the FTC’s January 2008 
workshop, FTC Chairman Majoras stated that despite the Commission’s 
intent to explore these scientific issues, she “want[ed] to make clear that 
[the FTC] [does not] . . . have the authority or the technical expertise to ad-
dress issues of environmental or energy regulation.”370  During recent con-
gressional hearings in July 2009, James Kohm reiterated that any marketing 
modifications must avoid “set[ting] environmental standards or policy,” 
because the Commission’s only purpose is to “protect[] consumers from 
unfair or deceptive practices.”371 
A major problem with the case-by-case approach is that “it fails to de-
marcate clear boundaries between deceptive and permissible practices [be-
cause] [c]ase-by-case adjudication by the FTC is selective, incremental, 
and highly contextual.”372  The continuing “surge of unsubstantiated and 
misleading green marketing claims” has proven that the case-by-case ap-
proach has not provided ample deterrence toward deceptive advertising 
practices.373 
5. Outdated Terminology: The Need for Current Environmental 
Regulation 
With the emergence of new technology and new terminology, the Green 
Guides have been criticized for being “simply out of touch with current en-
vironmental marketing realities.”374  FTC Chairman Majoras has admitted 
that the guides are outdated because, since their last revision in 1998, there 
has been increased use of environmental terminology and “terms like sus-
tainable, bio-based, cradle to cradle, and carbon neutral” have been intro-
 
 367. Id. 
 368. See News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 359. 
 369. Hoch & Franz, supra note 86, at 443; see also Steven W. Colford, FTC Confronts 
Green Muddle, ADVERTISING AGE, July 22, 1991, at 4. 
 370. Majoras, supra note 3, at 16. 
 371. News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 359 (discussing testimony presented 
by James Kohm, Dir. Enforcement Div., Fed. Trade Comm’n). 
 372. Grodsky, supra note 83, at 155. 
 373. See id. 
 374. Woods, supra note 15, at 83. 
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duced.375  “A decade-long drought in revisions means that more recent 
technologies and advertising terms are largely unregulated, including car-
bon offsets, renewable energy certificates, and green building products.”376 
The terms “carbon-neutral” and “carbon offset” have become particular-
ly prominent.377  For many consumers, buying a carbon neutral product is 
“more like a symbolic act than . . . an act of consumption” to show that a 
consumer’s buying power can make an environmental impact.378 General 
proponents of specific scientific definitions argue that whichever govern-
ment agency takes the reins, the latest terminology of carbon neutrality 
needs to be addressed in any future updates or regulations.  The Carbon 
Offset Providers Coalition similarly believes that the FTC or a governmen-
tal agency should establish guidelines for the use of certain terminology 
that is used in voluntary carbon markets.379 
Proponents further argue that monitoring the effects of carbon offset 
projects, the responsible distribution of carbon offset funds, and continued 
monitoring of advertising claims should all play substantial roles in devel-
oping a regulatory scheme for the carbon offset market.380  However, the 
difficulty in enforcing the accuracy of such claims is determining whether 
the advertising claim has met the required substantiation, especially at a 
time when the very meaning of “carbon offset” is still very much open to 
debate.381  If experts have not even reached a consensus on the means to 
define carbon neutrality and carbon offsets, the concern is that “consumers 
have no consistent information upon which to form opinions about carbon 
offsets.”382  One proposal is that to facilitate the verifiability of these 
claims, companies claiming a product has certain attributes must keep a 
record of the data for substantiation.383 
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 376. Woods, supra note 15, at 83. 
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B. Private Environmental Certifications 
Under a purely private model, third-party certification programs would 
continue to be the sole method of certification for environmental labeling in 
the United States.  Proponents of free market regulation advocate that an 
industry consensus will develop over time regarding the criteria for envi-
ronmental seals.384  For example, in the carbon labeling market, the Volun-
tary Carbon Standard has emerged as the most frequently used certification 
methodology.385  Recently, Green-e Climate, a voluntary certification pro-
gram based in the California, has created its own popular and independent 
carbon offset standards for emissions sold in the voluntary market.386  De-
spite their prominent use, there are still over ten carbon certification pro-
grams that are used in the United States alone, each with its own criteria, 
and Green-e Climate’s popularity indicates that other standards will contin-
ue to emerge.387  Thus, at present, “market stakeholders have not yet 
reached consensus on a particular standard or protocol,” and the varying 
standards can exacerbate consumer confusion.388 
Advocates of self-regulation have highlighted the success of the NAD’s 
industry enforcement program.  One of the most effective means for con-
sumers to combat false advertising has been by filing a complaint with the 
NAD of the Council of Better Business Bureaus.389  The NAD is the adver-
tising industry’s self regulating forum and provides for a formal adjudica-
tion of claims against false advertisers; it focuses on national cases involv-
ing consumer deception, maintains a strict confidentiality policy, and will 
not deal with cases that are pending or subject to federal agency action.390  
The NAD process is voluntary; however, they have been aggressive in pur-
suing actions against false advertising regarding green products.391  While 
participation in the process is technically voluntary, because of its reputa-
 
 384. See Hamilton, supra note 283, at 40. 
 385. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 879. 
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tion in the industry, “filing with this organization could be the most impor-
tant part of any action against a false advertiser.”392 
The benefit of third-party certification, proponents claim, is that these 
evaluations lower the cost of guaranteeing truthfulness in advertising.393  
These high costs occur under a government model in which a federal agen-
cy must monitor and regulate the accuracy of all claims.  The rationale is 
that the consumers will determine which products are best without the ex-
pense of governmental interference.394  Private certifiers can spread the 
cost of developing criteria, producing evaluations from consumers, and 
conducting large scale testing of products, all of which would amount to 
lower costs for consumers.395  Private program proponents believe that “the 
government should intervene in the market only when evidence of syste-
matic market failure exists.”396  When deceptive advertising is unregulated, 
it can result in a misallocation of resources, but “market failure alone 
[should] not necessarily justify government intervention.”397 
Critics of private regulation argue that the free market has created a sys-
tem of environmental seals that are granted for monetary exchange, which 
“invite[s] the possibility of bribery or improper influence.”398  Manufactur-
ers can choose from almost three-hundred environmental labels in order to 
place a green stamp of approval on their products, ten of which are specifi-
cally for carbon labeling.399  While many of these labels have standardized 
criteria and independent verification, some do not due to high cost and lack 
of manpower.400  Thus, critics argue that for carbon offsets especially, the 
“[c]ertification can only be as good as the standard is that it certifies by.”401 
Manufacturers are adopting differing standards for determining carbon 
offsets, often using their own methodology for the calculation.402  As a re-
sult, carbon offset purchases are generally a “scattered range of transac-
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tions,” described as a “wild west” or “buyer beware market.”403  One con-
cern with differing standards is, “what if [the] calculations or assumptions 
about environmental friendliness are wrong . . . ?”404  Though private, vo-
luntary certification has the potential to create an effective eco-labeling 
system, the industry seemingly has failed to police itself.405  Instead, it has 
chosen to take advantage of the profitable trade-off of “green,” without sa-
crificing or changing current manufacturing practices.406  Despite attempts 
to establish awareness, education, and credibility, private certifications 
have instead become known for extensive greenwashing.407 
C. The “Command and Control” Approach: A Purely Governmental 
Option 
“Under a command and control regulatory approach,” a government 
agency alone would be responsible for developing and enforcing environ-
mental advertising standards.408  Although the federal agency can delegate 
authority to a subcommittee within the agency or state agencies, the role of 
the private sector and general public is limited to self-reporting inci-
dents.409 
A strictly governmental program could “offer advantages . . . of credibil-
ity, accountability, and . . . technical expertise.”410  For example, it would 
eliminate the multitude of private certification companies, as well as con-
cerns of bribery or reduced standards during the certification process.411  
However, a strictly government-operated program also poses several disad-
vantages.  Maria Kennedy, a professor specializing in environmental law, 
advises that “[g]iven the unique nature of the carbon offset market, strict 
adherence to a traditional command and control approach with limited op-
portunities for stakeholder input in the creation of a uniform certification 
standard for offset projects is not ideal.”412  First, it would not allow for lo-
cal solutions to address local problems because federal law would preempt 
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individual state practices.413  Additionally, it would create huge administra-
tive overhead costs to independently test products and provide certification 
to companies.  Particularly in the area of carbon offsets, administrative de-
lay would be particularly problematic because these “rely on timely certifi-
cation in order to attract funding sources.”414 
D. A Joint Agency Framework 
To combine the experience of the FTC and EPA, one suggestion is a 
joint agency approach in creating and enforcing environmental advertising 
regulations.415  One prominent proposal is for the EPA to create the volun-
tary standards and technical definitions for the use of environmental mar-
keting claims, which would then be enforced by both the FTC and the 
EPA.416  While the guidelines are considered a “helpful addition,” many 
commentators believe the EPA should create the regulations because it 
“has more experience and qualifications.”417  This would create a system 
with mandatory adherence to environmental marketing regulations and 
technical-based definitions to give guidance to manufacturers, and “may 
even encourage the development of more ecologically-minded production 
strategies and techniques that permit the company to boast even greater en-
vironmental benefits.”418 
III.  WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CARBON 
ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING REGULATIONS 
Part III of this Note proposes instituting binding environmental advertis-
ing regulations and a voluntary carbon eco-labeling program that utilizes 
the advantages of both the government and private sector.  This model 
should address the deficiencies in the Green Guides by creating a binding, 
uniform standard of regulations with definitions based on scientific exper-
tise that still provide sufficient flexibility for rapidly evolving technology.  
It would also create a voluntary carbon eco-labeling program that would 
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issue certification to private companies.  The program should be designed 
by the EPA in conjunction with outside experts and jointly enforced by the 
EPA, the FTC, and state authorities.  Part III advances the position that the 
substantial rise in greenwashing and inadequate self-regulation by third-
party private certification programs requires a new and effective system of 
regulations operated by the federal government to maintain consumer con-
fidence. 
A. Creating a Carbon Advertising Framework 
In the early 1990s, lack of consumer understanding about the ozone 
layer and biodegradability created a market ripe for consumer exploita-
tion.419  Since the 1990s, consumer awareness of those terms has increased, 
but the lexicon of “green” terminology continues to grow and the market 
for various products containing new advertising claims is still expanding.420  
Voluntary carbon offsets fall within this category.421 
As demonstrated by their advertising presence and sales success, carbon 
neutral products and carbon offsets have gained considerable popularity.422  
However, the utter lack of regulation combined with minimal consumer 
understanding of carbon offsets raises significant concerns that manufac-
turers will exploit the new terminology by using deceptive or misleading 
claims.  Although greenwashing may be commonplace in the general con-
sumer purchasing market,423 the government can prevent the rise of decep-
tion in carbon advertising by issuing changes before consumer confidence 
in carbon purchasing is severely affected. 
The creation of a new regulatory framework for green marketing should 
focus on balancing the interests of consumers, manufacturers, and govern-
ment agencies.  The goals of such regulations should be to achieve “truthful 
and accurate . . . marketing,” to provide “a continuing incentive for compa-
nies to improve the environmental characteristics of their products,” to 
promote “consumer confidence in environmental marketing claims,” and to 
improve the regulation of deceptive or misleading claims.424 
The most effective means of meeting these objectives is instituting a vo-
luntary eco-labeling program and binding regulations for green advertising 
that create uniform and specific standards.  Such a program should address 
the current deficiencies in the Green Guides. 
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Any carbon-related environmental advertising regulation will implicate 
environmental policy and thus veer into the regulatory territory of the EPA.  
As the FTC has repeatedly insisted, it is not the agency to devise environ-
mental policy,425 rather, the EPA, whose mandate is to promote environ-
mental protection, should take the lead in carbon advertising regulations.426 
The most efficient means of creating a new program would be for Con-
gress to enact legislation authorizing the EPA to both promulgate regula-
tions for carbon environmental advertising and to devise a national eco-
labeling program.427  However, even without specific congressional autho-
rization, Massachusetts v. EPA emphasized the EPA’s responsibility to ad-
dress greenhouse gas emissions;428 as a result, the EPA would have the 
specific authority to create a program focusing exclusively on carbon labe-
ling.  Moreover, the EPA has significant expertise in environmental labe-
ling programs, as evidenced by its success with Energy Star, a program im-
plemented without any congressional authorization.429 
The EPA should issue two types of carbon environmental advertising 
regulation.  First, it should provide scientific definitions for environmental 
terminology so that manufacturers are not permitted to utilize those terms 
in advertisements without complying with their definitions.  Second, while 
the EPA could implement a general eco-labeling program, the EPA should 
devise a specific carbon eco-labeling program. 
B. A Uniform Standard for Environmental Advertising 
To improve environmental advertising regulations, the EPA should issue 
technical definitions, based on scientific expertise, that are commonly used 
in environmental advertising.  The EPA has already issued definitions and 
guidelines for many of these terms.430  The EPA can use those definitions 
or create definitions specifically for this program, but it must provide pre-
cise definitions for new terminology, such as “sustainable,” “renewable,” 
and “carbon neutral.”  The EPA can look to the Voluntary Carbon Standard 
or the PAS 2050, both internationally used standards that provide defini-
tions of key terms utilized by manufacturers.431  By creating federally 
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preemptive regulations based on scientific standards, the EPA program can 
correct the major deficiencies in current environmental advertising regula-
tions.432 
These regulations containing definitions would be binding federal law, 
which would eliminate concerns created by voluntary guidelines that mere-
ly suggest definitions.  The FTC could thus no longer avoid taking action 
against the voluminous number of misleading advertisements, which would 
automatically constitute a federal violation.  Binding regulations would al-
so give advertisers greater notice of potential FTC action and could help 
reduce misleading practices.  The regulations would also decrease consum-
er confusion and provide consumers an opportunity to make social choices 
that genuinely reward manufacturers producing goods that address carbon 
emissions.433  The FTC could additionally monitor whether a company is 
using national carbon seals without proper certification.  By utilizing a joint 
agency approach, the EPA would have a substantial role in monitoring and 
enforcing regulations. 
Because the eco-labeling program would be federal law, it would 
preempt state environmental marketing laws and state statutory definitions, 
such as those in New York and California.434  It is primarily the lack of un-
iformity in state regulations that has created difficulties for manufactur-
ers.435  Advertisers would not have the same costs that are associated with 
monitoring fifty independent standards,436 nor would they have the direct 
costs of adapting their advertisements to each state’s regulations.  In the 
specific context of carbon labeling, where there are at least ten diverse cer-
tifications,437 uniformity would provide guidance to advertisers as well as 
consumers. 
Next, the regulations would address the Green Guides’ lack of specifici-
ty by creating clear, scientific definitions, not those based on what a scien-
tific term “might” mean to a consumer.438  The FTC does not currently 
have more specific definitions because it is concerned it would be making 
environmental policy.  But if the EPA were to create the definitions, it 
would clearly fall within its realm of authority.  One of the fundamental 
concerns expressed by carbon offset industry representatives is that there is 
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no clear definition of a “carbon offset.”439  The most controversial aspect of 
the definition is the concept of “additionality,”440 which requires that the 
carbon offset truly reduce emissions that would not have happened without 
the offset credit and should be incorporated into the EPA’s definition of a 
carbon offset.441  Current offsets do not guarantee that a product has met 
that additionality standard or even that consumer funds will support active 
projects.  Creating a standard for carbon offsets that includes a requirement 
of additionality will continue incentivizing consumers to make purchases 
and avoid future skepticism. 
Finally, the regulations administered by the EPA would correct the 
Green Guides’ inadequacies of outdated terminology and lack of scientific 
substantiation.442  The new standards must include definitions for more re-
cent terminology utilized in advertising strategies, such as “carbon offsets,” 
“carbon footprint,” “carbon neutral,” and “sustainability.”  Once the EPA 
has created the definitions, the FTC should rigorously enforce its deceptive 
advertising policy in regulating advertisements containing these terms so 
that regulation can be enforced from the beginning of the trend, not once it 
has already caused substantial consumer confusion and deterred purchasing 
decisions. 
C. A National Eco-Labeling Program: A Carbon Certification Seal 
The EPA would also be responsible for establishing and issuing a carbon 
certification seal that would be granted to private manufacturing compa-
nies.  Because the carbon offset market is still relatively new,443 the number 
of private certification programs is not nearly as expansive compared to 
general environmental certification programs.  Furthermore, many carbon 
offset providers have called for definitions and regulations to enhance con-
sumer confidence.444  Because a carbon certification seal would be volunta-
ry, those opposed to the EPA’s program could simply elect not to submit 
their products for certification.  While eliminating other carbon certifica-
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tion seals might reduce the risk of confusion among consumers, this ap-
proach would likely be considered a ban on commercial speech and would 
not be upheld by the courts.445  However, the goal of a voluntary govern-
ment-sponsored carbon seal would be to create consumer awareness and 
confidence that a product has met certain standards.  The government could 
help achieve this objective by utilizing an advertising campaign that raises 
awareness of the label and touts the legitimacy of the government seal over 
private certifications. 
The program for a carbon certification seal should be a public-private 
hybrid model that follows the procedures exhibited in the organic frame-
work and international examples.446  First, the EPA would create a national 
seal that would be applied to products indicating they have met certain cri-
teria.  Though the seal may not initially gain national recognition, over 
time, like the Energy Star label and Germany’s Blue Angel logo, consum-
ers will associate the environmental seal with the EPA and greater credi-
bility.447  Like Blue Angel and the UK Carbon Trust program, the EPA 
should create product categories that are eligible for a national carbon certi-
fication.448  To eliminate many of the delays and transaction costs, the EPA 
should have the authority to directly determine product categories eligible 
for the seal.  While it could still seek and review public comments from 
third parties, it would be too time consuming and inefficient to have a con-
tinuous back and forth between numerous panels and the EPA.  To general-
ly calculate the greenhouse gas emissions of product categories, the EPA or 
a third-party agency monitored by the EPA should test products within 
those categories.  Because product testing is one of the most expensive 
areas, the EPA has traditionally left testing to the manufacturers them-
selves, which has created issues in substantiating product claims.  One 
means of lowering costs is for the EPA to rely on the extensive product 
category testing that has been conducted by Germany, the United King-
dom, and other European countries. 
Once the product categories are selected, the EPA must establish a 
process for testing individual products that are submitted by manufacturers 
to determine if they meet the carbon seal requirements.  While the EPA 
could devise its own standard for calculating the carbon emissions of a 
product, it could easily adopt the widely accepted Voluntary Carbon Stan-
dard or PAS 2050 standards, which calculate the greenhouse gas emissions 
 
 445. See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text. 
 446. See supra notes 206-10, 211-28, 232-40 and accompanying text. 
 447. See supra notes 170-73, 229-31 and accompanying text. 
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of a product throughout its life cycle.449  An advisory board composed of 
scientists, consumers, retailers, manufacturers, environmentalists, and car-
bon offset providers should be formed to determine which testing criteria 
should be adopted.450  They should have an opportunity to advocate or cri-
tique either of these methods or propose an entirely new method for calcu-
lating emissions without utilizing the resources of the EPA. 
The advisory board would also make comments and suggestions on 
standards for determining how products in each category would be deemed 
certifiable.451  Under the Blue Angel program, manufacturers submit their 
own data, which creates issues of falsification because companies could 
doctor information to ensure their products are eligible for the seal.452  The 
UK’s Carbon Trust Footprint Company also permits companies to calculate 
their own carbon footprints to determine if they meet the certification re-
quirements.453  One solution would be for the EPA to partner with a pri-
vately operated testing facility which could either test individual products 
or analyze data submitted by manufacturers to ensure its accuracy.  Al-
though individual testing may be costly, if the EPA is committed to dis-
playing accurate carbon information, it may be necessary to at least initially 
conduct such testing to demonstrate to manufacturers that deceptive infor-
mation will not be tolerated.  This would lend greater credibility to the car-
bon certification program.  Based on the input of the advisory board, the 
EPA would then adopt criteria for greenhouse gas calculations and testing 
procedures for submitted products. 
Once a product complies with the EPA criteria, the EPA would provide 
the company with a certification seal to place on the product or use in 
product advertising.  The carbon seal would indicate to consumers that the 
product has met government-established criteria and consumers could seek 
out the seal to reduce confusion in their decision making.  Additionally, 
like the UK Carbon Trust program, the seal would indicate to consumers 
that the company is making an environmentally conscious commitment to 
lowering its carbon emissions.454  When “the same term[] in a similar sys-
tem of presentation or format [is used] to convey information, it signals to 
consumers that there is a consensus or maybe even a supervising entity in-
 
 449. See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text. 
 450. See supra notes 207-08, 222-23 and accompanying text. 
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volved.”455  Thus, as the seal became more widely used, consumers would 
gain greater confidence in the seal’s credibility.456 
The advisory board should determine just how much information should 
be contained in the carbon certification seal.  It could simply provide a logo 
to be placed on products or it could provide consumers with more informa-
tion about the carbon footprint of a particular product.  If the EPA opts to 
use simply a logo, as it does with the Energy Star program, the standards 
for calculating the greenhouse gas emissions should be freely available to 
the public on its website. To offset some costs of the program, the EPA 
should require a fee in exchange for this advertising licensing agreement.457 
The final step in creating a national carbon seal is the process of certifi-
cation.  The United States Energy Star and Organic Foods programs both 
have faced criticism that their certifications are unreliable and lack go-
vernmental oversight.458  The major problem under the OFPA is that, while 
the regulations create USDA accredited agents, organic producers have the 
option to select their own certifying agent.459  The Energy Star program 
does not even require a certifying agent, but relies solely on the manufac-
turer’s claim that their product has met the criteria before being granted the 
Energy Star logo.460  The result can be minimal enforcement and a down-
ward drive toward minimum standards. 
There are two proposed methods of combating the risks associated with 
the certifying process.  The government agency could either be chiefly re-
sponsible for the certification or the EPA could implement changes to ad-
dress the risks associated with third-party certification.  One proposal to re-
duce risk is to adopt the suggested model where manufacturers seeking 
certification pay into a general fund administered by the government or a 
third-party partner of the government, which then randomly assigns a cer-
tifier to a project and pays the certifier from the general fund.461  This could 
potentially resolve the problem of companies self-selecting accrediting 
 
 455. Levy, supra note 21.  Levy cites to the consistent style and format of nutrition fact 
panels as one of the main reasons they have gained consumer confidence. Id. 
 456. See id. 
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 458. See Energy Star Has Lost Some Luster, CONSUMER REP., Oct. 2008, at 24-25, avail-
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agents because they are aware that particular agents have lower standards 
than others for accreditation.  Testing products or requiring research proto-
cols that are independently verified could also help correct the lack of gov-
ernment oversight that currently exists in U.S. labeling programs. 
The final component of an eco-labeling program is establishing a me-
thod of enforcement.  Although the EPA should be primarily responsible 
for developing the standards and evaluating a product’s criteria for certifi-
cation, the FTC and state governments should play a crucial role in enforc-
ing the regulations.  States are currently responsible for enforcing laws un-
der the Clean Air Act, and if a carbon-focused eco-labeling program was 
promulgated under the Act, states could implement such changes in their 
continued enforcement.  The enforcement would also be more effective and 
better utilize resources if it supplemented a solely federal enforcement sys-
tem because the threat of both federal and state litigation could induce 
greater compliance from manufacturers. 
CONCLUSION 
Though greenwashing is a significant obstacle to increasing consumer 
understanding of environmental claims, a nationwide eco-labeling program 
would reduce consumer confusion over time.  Carbon labeling is an inno-
vative way to encourage consumers, manufacturers, and government agen-
cies to stay apprised of the latest technology and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.  A carbon labeling program would provide consumers with the 
information necessary to make environmentally conscious decisions and 
encourage manufacturers to reduce the negative environmental impact of 
the goods they produce. 
